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Abstract  
Recent literature on Political Budget Cycles has provided appealing evidence that their 
existence is conditional to country specific characteristics. In this paper we hypothesize that 
the level of social capital prevailing in a country might be an underlying fundamental reason 
that might be driving these results. We provide strong evidence that political budget cycles 
are only present in low social capital countries by utilizing a large panel data set for 63 
democratic countries. We also show that the political budget cycles occur both in developing 
and developed countries under low social capital. Simultaneously, our results are robust under 
most other conditional effects considered by the literature. Finally, we also propose a 
theoretical model of conditional capital budget cycles by adapting a moral hazard model to 
account for different distributions of social capital.  
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1. Introduction 
     
It was during the 1992 Presidential election when James Carville, campaign strategist of 
Bill Clinton, first used the phrase “It’s the economy, stupid”. Clinton won the elections with 
a plurality in popular vote and a wide electoral margin, a result mainly attributed to the 
unfavorable economic condition prevailing at the time. The importance of economic 
performance for election outcomes was initially stressed in a series of empirical studies (Kerr 
1944, Pearson and Mayers 1948, Tibbits 1931)1  leading to the most influential work of 
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Kramer (1971) and Fair (1978, 1982, 1988) that constituted a link between real economic 
activity and voting behavior. The empirical support for the influence of the pre-election 
economic performance on voter’s decisions motivated the introduction of political business 
cycles literature, referring to the fluctuation of the economy induced by the political cycles.  
The pioneering model of Nordhaus (1975) was the first attempt to theoretically formalize 
the connection between opportunistic politician behavior and pre-election economic 
outcomes. The pivotal role on Nordhaus model is played by monetary policy leading to a 
short-term Philips curve2 manipulation. Hibbs (1977) presented a model where partisan policy 
makers, based on party views about macroeconomic policy, will cause distinct pre-election 
outcomes with respect to unemployment and inflation. However, as the literature was 
evolving, it became apparent that the general Political Business Cycles theory embodied 
several shortcomings with respect to empirical and anecdotal evidence. Firstly the existence 
of evidence with respect to the effect on the real economy due to manipulation during the pre-
election year is questionable. Several empirical studies indicate no significant increase in 
aggregate economic activity prior to election (McCallum 1978, Alesina, Roubini and Cohen, 
Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy 1997, Faust and Irons 1999, Paldam 1979)3. Lewis-
Beck (1988) tries to rationalize the results by arguing that monetary and fiscal policy can only 
be used imprecisely, thus politicians are unable to perfectly time the manipulation. Secondly, 
with respect to monetary policy, Drazen (2001), summarizing the literature, argues that 
although both inflation and money growth demonstrated evidence of manipulation until 
1980’s, there is no observable evidence thereafter, concluding that models based on 
manipulation of the economy via monetary policy tend to be unconvincing both empirically 
and theoretically. Finally, with respect to partisan models, Shi and Svenson (2003) argue that 
they are inadequate to address evidence in developing countries where ideological differences 
are unclear. Hence, the focus of empirical and theoretical studies turned to Political Budget 
Cycles, which refer to the opportunistic politician’s behavior aiming to increase their 
reelection probabilities through fiscal manipulation.  
A variety of studies find supporting evidence for Political Budget Cycles, by shifting away 
from the effects on the real economy to the fiscal instruments politicians use, both in a single- 
and multi-country level. However, and although there is a widespread consensus for the 
existence of Political Budget Cycles, there is a disagreement with respect to whether they 
constitute a universal phenomenon. Furthermore, the cross country literature is very diverse 
and inconclusive with respect to the conditionality of Political Budget Cycles. Some 
influential studies are focusing on conditionality based on seemingly institutional features of 
countries such as New versus Established democracies (Brender and Drazen 2005) and 
Developing versus Developed countries (Shi and Svensson 2006), however this approach has 
several deficiencies. Firstly it doesn’t try to uncover the underlying fundamental determinant 
that causes the conditional effect4. As Brender and Drazen argue, although there is clear 
evidence that new democracies are more susceptible than established to election-year 
economics, its beyond their current scope to uncover the underlying reason. The same holds 
for the separation between developing and developed economies. Secondly there is an 
                                                        
1 The first two employed longitudinal data and the last one cross-sectional. Both streams were followed by several 
studies. For a comprehensive review of early studies see Kramer (1971). 
2 Representing the negative relationship between unemployment and inflation (Phillips 1958). 
3 Drazen (2001) summarizes the empirical studies with respect to political cycle in economic activity.  
4 There are exceptions in the literature (Shi and Svensson 2002, Klomp and De Haan 2013) for which we will 
elaborate in the literature review section (section 2.2). 
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arbitrarity of the definitions and distinctions5, reinforced by the fact that only discrete dummy 
variables are used for separation. Addressing these deficiencies, in this paper we are aiming 
to propose one of the fundamental, underlying reasons by focusing on the country specific 
quality of informal institutions, and more specifically social capital. Social capital refers to 
the notion of informal institutions proxied by the level of generalized trust6. We find that 
strong fiscal cycles are only present in low social capital democracies and the effect of the 
election year becomes insignificant for high social capital countries. Additionally we offer a 
theoretical moral hazard model7 that constitutes the analytical background.  
To conclude the remainder of the paper will be structured as follows. Firstly we will review 
both the theoretical and the empirical literature with respect to political budget cycles in 
section 2 of the paper. Secondly we will analyze the interconnection between the functioning 
of democracies and the concept of social capital by simultaneously stressing the importance 
for the occurrence of political budget cycles. Additionally, in section 4, we will present a 
theoretical model of political budget cycles conditional on social capital. In section 5 we will 
introduce the empirical analysis, followed by the results and a robustness analysis. Finally in 
sections 7 and 8 will include a discussion of the results and a conclusion. 
 
 
2. From Political Business Cycles to Budget Cycles: A Literature Review 
 
The literature on Political Budget Cycles constitutes a derivative of the general literature 
of Political Business Cycles. In light of this close interrelation we will also briefly cover the 
early literature on Political Business Cycles, both in the theoretical and the empirical review 
part. However the focus will be mostly on the later literature on Political Budget Cycles. At 
this point it is essential to make the differences between the two literature streams as explicit 
as possible. Political business cycles refer to the possibility of a macroeconomic cycle being 
induced by the election cycle, and as such cover all possible instruments8 used by policy 
makers to effect the economy. On the other hand Political Budget Cycles are restricted to 
manipulation undertaken only through fiscal policy9. Thus the literature is naturally divided 
into models that are based on monetary or on fiscal manipulation. Furthermore, the theoretical 
literature is characterized by two main streams of models: partisan versus opportunistic. We 
will follow these natural separations throughout this section. 
 
2.1. The Theoretical Literature 
 
Since the early 1970’s endogenous treatment of policy makers became increasing popular 
in the macroeconomic literature. With his seminal paper, Nordhaus (1975) first introduced a 
formal model of opportunistic politicians focusing on monetary manipulation, aiming to time 
a decrease in unemployment in the pre-election period and thus causing an increase their re-
election possibilities. In a parallel vein Lindbeck (1976) and McRae (1977) presented very 
                                                        
5 A new democracy is defined as one that changes a sign in polity index during the sample years, however one can 
argue that this is arbitrary and can lead to several biases. Brender and Drazen (2005) try to address this issue by 
including discrete cases of time evolution, however this is susceptible to a type -two error as the sample size is 
also decreasing on the same time. 
6 We will refrain from further analysis at this point of the concept of social capital, as we include a detailed 
literature review section focusing on the interlinkages between social capital and the functioning of democracies. 
7 Based on the model of Shi and Svensson (2002). 
8 Both monetary and fiscal. 
9 An additional distinction, especially in the empirical literature is that is focused on the effect on the instrument 
of manipulation, for example the budget balance and not the general effect on the real economy. 
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similar approaches, by providing reasons why governments will try to destabilize the 
economy for selfish reasons. The rationale is simple and intuitive, given the correlation 
between election results and favorable economic conditions, policy makers will try to 
artificially cause an economic boom in the pre-election period to maximize their election 
possibilities. Thus policy makers try to exploit adaptive expectations and sticky nominal 
contracts by surprisingly increasing the money supply in the pre-election period. Although 
for all early models monetary policy was the main instrument of manipulation, distinctions 
existed with respect to objectives and the heterogeneity of policy makers. Hence, soon after 
the initial models, Hibbs (1977) introduced a model based on partisan policy makers. The 
main distinction between early models was whether governments use the policy instrument 
to achieve partisan or opportunistic goals. Partisan goals are driven by ideological differences 
between parties, for example right-wing versus left-wing, aiming for different points along 
the Phillips curve. Following Hibbs, Alesina (1987, 1988) introduced rational expectations 
into the political business cycles, as in Hibbs the motives were purely partisan. Consistent 
with rational expectations was also the models of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) as well as 
Persson and Tabellini (1990) that assumed information asymmetries 10  to rationalize the 
existence of cycles. Finally Lohmann (1998) introduces a moral hazard model based on 
monetary pre-election expansions. To sum up, early models of Political Business Cycles 
focused on monetary manipulation and were divided based on manipulation incentives, 
partisan or opportunistic11.  
 
2.1.1. The Political Budget Cycle Models 
 
Several empirical inconsistences 12  of the early models led to the introduction of the 
Political Budget Cycles literature. Hence, now the instrument of manipulation is shifted 
towards fiscal policy. In the case of fiscal induced cycles the first model was introduced by 
Rogoff and Sibert (1988). Similarly to the model of Alesina (1987), they assumed rational 
expectations but this time the cycle is set in motion by information asymmetries. The 
competence level of the incumbent is initially unknown and the fiscal expansion is used for 
signaling. Thus the more competent the incumbent the more able he will be to signal by 
manipulating the fiscal policy in the pre-election period. However this is at odds with 
anecdotal evidence where we expect the less competent politician to be the one that is more 
susceptive to manipulating the economy.  In a follow up model, consistent with information 
asymmetries, Rogoff (1990) argues that there will be a shift towards more easily observable 
public goods and away from investment. Although again the most competent one is able to 
accommodate the shift, the model gives an interesting insight, as voters are either not able to 
observe some categories of expenditure or they discount it in a larger than socially optimal 
discount rate13. The early models focusing on fiscal expansion can be categorized as adverse 
selection models, where information asymmetries are an essential prerequisite and the 
incumbent signals its competence. Shi and Svensson (2003) argue that these models have a 
pivotal role in the literature of Political Business Cycles for three main reasons. Firstly, they 
assume rationality and strategic behavior. Secondly they focus on the instrument of 
                                                        
10 The model is similar to the model of Rogoff (1990) which is based on fiscal manipulation, which we introduce 
in the next paragraph following the logical separation between monetary and fiscal manipulatons. 
11 The early models were further divided based on expectation formation with rational expectations being the 
successor of adaptive expectations, reframing from myopic into rational voters. 
12 We will elaborate more in the empirical review section. 
13 This insight will be later used by Person and Tabelinni (2000) and Shi Svensson (2002). 
Political Budget Cycles Revisited: The Case of Social Capital 
  
 
5 
manipulation and thus allow for empirical testing. Finally they are supported by the empirical 
literature.  
The most recent models on Political Budget Cycles evolved from adverse selection into 
moral hazard models14. Examples of moral hazard models focusing on budget cycles are the 
models of Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Shi and Svensson (2002). The critical difference 
to previous models is that neither the voter nor the incumbent know its’ competence level. In 
essence the policy maker is unsure of his performance before actualizing it. Thus, all policy 
makers have an incentive to shift to unobservable, at the current instance, financing through 
debt to increase the public goods provision. The main instrument of manipulation is the pre-
election budget balance through issuing debt. Any type of incumbent has an incentive to 
increase the debt and the provision of public goods and the level will depend on the percentage 
of voters able to observe the real debt. A critical implication of these models is that they shift 
the interest from the incumbent to the voter and based on the information the voter has, or is 
able to assess, the level of the pre-election manipulation is derived.  
To sum up, the theoretical literature on Political Business Cycles is divided based on the 
instruments and the motives of manipulation. Although initial models focused on monetary 
policy their recent counterparts, termed as Budget Cycles models are focusing on fiscal policy 
providing a framework that is more easily testable and consistent with anecdotal evidence. 
Within the Political Budget Cycles literature the division is centered around either the level 
of competence of the incumbent or the level voters are able to observe pre-election debt 
issuance.  
 
2.2. The Empirical Literature 
 
Analogous to the theoretical literature review we will initially focus on the evidence with 
respect to the use of monetary policy as the incumbent’s instrument. Sequentially we will turn 
our focus to the empirical evidence with respect to Political Budget Cycles and the 
conditionality with respect to the cross country evidence. Finally we will briefly review the 
evolution of the empirical methods used in the literature, stressing the implications and 
possible disadvantages with respect to the consistency of the estimators. 
The theoretical model of Nordhaus (1975) sparked a series of empirical studies testing the 
hypothesized appearance of Political Business Cycles. The approaches of identification are 
diverse and focus either on real economic fluctuations, post-election inflation or pre-election 
monetary growth. Firstly with respect to economic activity most attempts fail to find 
significant evidence in support of the hypothesized unemployment differences during pre- 
and post-election periods. Early empirical studies focusing on data from the United States, 
fail to conclude in favor of the existence of politically induced cycles as assumed by the 
Nordhaus model (Golden and Poterba 1980, Alesina and Sachs 1988, Alesina 1988). 
Additionally Alesina and Roubini (1990) verify the absence of evidence by focusing on 
OECD countries. In line with the previous conclusions Chrystal and Alt (1979) test the model 
of McRae (1977)  and fail to find supporting evidence. A more sophisticated approach, 
utilizing a standard vector autoregression framework, is presented by Faust and Irons (1999) 
finding almost no support in accordance with the previous studies. Thus the literature provides 
no consistent evidence in support of economic fluctuations induced by the political cycle. 
Secondly with respect to post election inflation there exists clear evidence across OECD 
countries (Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997), however when focusing in the United States 
evidence is only present evidence until 1979; a fact attributed to the change of the policy rules 
                                                        
14 Following Lohmann’s (1998) model but focusing on fiscal signaling. 
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of Federal Reserve (Clarida, Cali and Gertler 1999). Finally, with respect to money growth, 
Alesina and Roubini (1990) find consistent evidence in support of a pre-election increase for 
OECD countries. Similarly Beck (1987) and Grier (1989) both find evidence in support of 
pre-election increase in money growth for the United States. Testing the monetary partisan 
model both Alesina (1988) and Faust and Irons (1999) as well as Alesina and Roudini (1990) 
confirm the hypothesis for the United States and for a sample of OECD countries. However 
it is unclear how we can generalize the conclusions when it comes to developing countries, 
where ideological differences between parties are unobservable. Thus we conclude that the 
evidence for models based on monetary manipulation is mixed and often inconclusive, 
providing a rationalization for the evolution of the literature towards fiscally induced cycles.  
 
2.2.1. Political Budget Cycles: Evidence and Methods 
 
There exists an abundance of studies that aim to constitute a link between elections and 
fiscal budget cycles. One can classify these studies into three main categories: a) early, single 
country studies, b) studies within groups of similar countries and c) recent studies that 
investigate the conditionality of the budget cycles. The earliest and highly influential study of 
Tufte (1978), who by investigating pre-election fiscal policy in the United States was the first 
to confirm the existence of Political Budget Cycles empirically. In a parallel vein, Frey and 
Sneider reaffirm the budget cycles hypothesis in two independent papers for the UK (1978) 
and the US (1978). Alesina (1988) focusing on data from the United States with a time span 
from 1961-1985, verifies and reinforces the results of earlier studies. Utilizing a similar 
framework Krueger and Turan (1993) also provide supporting evidence for the existence of a 
pre-election fiscal manipulation for Turkey during the years 1950-1980. 
Turning to multi-country studies, at first the studies had the tendency to focus on similar 
group of countries. The main prominent categories were groups of developing or developed 
nations. First, with respect to developing countries Ames (1987) finds a significant increase 
of pre-election government expenditures in a panel of 17 Latin American countries. 
Additionally Block (2002) investigates the existence of pre electoral fiscal expansions on a 
group of 44 sub-Saharan African countries concluding in favors of the existence of a strong 
fiscal cycle. Another example is the study of Schuknecht (1996) that focuses on a group of 35 
less developed countries and finds that policy makers pursued expansionary policy before 
elections and austerity afterwards. Similarly for developed countries Alesina and Roubini 
(1990) also find supporting evidence in a study of 18 OECD countries. In a more recent study 
focusing on the European Union Mink and de Haan (2011) find strong evidence that since the 
introduction of the stability and growth pact (SGP) and thus the restriction of monetary 
freedom of country policy makes, expansionary policies have been pursued before elections. 
Despite the existence of compelling evidence for the case of Political Budget Cycles, 
multi-country studies seem to be subject to some conditionality based on institutional 
characteristics of countries. The source of this conditionally has been in the center of lively 
debate between scholars in the recent years. First, Shi and Svensson (2002, 2006) made the 
case for the presence of fiscal cycles being more prominent in developing compared to 
developed countries. Simultaneously, they tried to identify the underlying reason by arguing 
that the conditionality is due the abundant existence of informed voters and the size of rents 
that can be extracted from the politicians, finding significant evidence for both. However the 
proxies15 that they use are somewhat questionable with respect to what they are capturing. It 
                                                        
15 They use as proxies for the informed voter the amount of radios per capita and the freedom of broadcasting. For 
the rents they use as proxies the quality of institutions, like the rule of law. 
Political Budget Cycles Revisited: The Case of Social Capital 
  
 
7 
is important here to state that the prior intuition seems rational. Nevertheless, in the section 4 
we will argue that the seemingly two factors can be confined into a single, more fundamental 
one: the quality of institutions, both formal and informal16. 
Another influential study is that of Persson and Tabellini (2002), tracing the conditionality 
to different sets of constitutional rules. They provide evidence that democracies based on 
proportional systems are more prone to experiencing fiscal cycles compared to the ones based 
on majoritarian voting systems. In an effort to rationalize their findings they argue that they 
are in agreement with a general notion among political scientists that majoritarian rules are 
geared towards keeping politicians accountable, whereas proportional rules are geared 
towards keeping voters represented. Additionally, they make a distinction between 
presidential and parliamentary systems; however with respect to pre-election tax cuts they 
argue that it is a universal phenomenon. 
Several characteristics of democracy have also been examined as potential conditional 
variables. Gonzalez (2002) shows that changes in the degree of democracy have an 
incremental effect on the appearance of budget cycles. Alt and Lassen (2006), using a sample 
of 19 OECD countries, provide evidence that political budget cycles are conditional on the 
degree of fiscal transparency and polarization. Furthermore, Klomp and de Haan (2013) apply 
a pooled mean group estimator on a large panel of 70 democratic countries and find that 
political budget cycles are affected by the level of democracy, government transparency the 
country’s political system and political polarization.  
In an influential paper Brender and Drazen (2005) argue that political budget cycles are 
only conditional on new democracies. They define new democracies as those that have 
changed from autocracy to democracy during their sample years, a definition somewhat non-
general as it is conditional to their sample. Nevertheless they compared their result to several 
conditional variables that have been proposed and they show that the existence of political 
budget cycles is driven by new democracies. In detail, they provide evidence that  both 
developed and developing countries, experience budget cycles only if they are new 
democracies.  
Having discussed the findings of the empirical literature with respect to politically induced 
cycles, we will now turn to the evolution of the econometric models used to test for the 
election effect. Since early studies focus on single countries, they utilize a simple OLS 
model17 that includes a lag of the dependent variable, several economic control variables and 
an election dummy. This model is a single-country counterpart of the models used later in the 
literature. When multi-country studies became more popular, panel versions of the original 
model were utilized. However, due to possible country heterogeneity18 the simple pooled OLS 
estimator tends to be biased. As a solution to this problem panel fixed effects were 
introduced19, albeit that comes at a cost; since the model includes a lag dependent variable a 
new bias is introduced (Nickell 1981)20 which is more severe in short panels. As a result most 
modern versions of the model tried to tackle this problem by the use of initially Arellano’s 
and Bond’s (1991) and later Arellano’s and Bover’s (1995)  and Blundell’s and Bond’s (1998) 
methodologies. As such most recent studies are based either on a fixed effects version of the 
                                                        
16 We the focus on the informal ones and more specifically social capital as especially in developing countries 
there exists an evident lack of formal institutions, but as we show in the empirical part, high social capital tends to 
compensate for that. 
17 Firstly introduced by Alesina (1988). 
18 That is not captured by the explanatory variables. 
19 For examples see Alesina et al. (1990, 1997). 
20 For a more elaborate discution please refer to section 5.1. 
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original model (e.g. Brender and Drazen 2005) or on GMM (e.g. Shi and Svensson 2006), 
dependent on the length of the time dimension. 
To sum up, the empirical literature with respect to Political Budget Cycles is conclusive 
with respect to their occurrence; however tends to be inconclusive with respect to budget 
cycles as a universal phenomenon. Hence, several conditional variables have been proposed 
to explain the differences between countries such as: developing versus developed countries, 
new versus established democracies, constitutional rules and other societal characteristic, 
albeit the results are not unambiguous. Finally, the econometric methods used have come a 
long way since the early models, leading to the use of more efficient and consistent estimators. 
 
 
3. The Concept of Social Capital and the Functioning of Democracies 
 
During the past decades there has been an ongoing turn of attention from the traditional 
forms of capital, human and physical, to the notion of social capital as an important 
determinant of economic development. The notion of social capital was introduced initially 
by Coleman (1988) and is now commonly defined as generalized trust (Beugelsdijk and 
Maseland 2011). In a detailed definition, social capital is described as the willingness to trust 
others, often strangers, without expectation of immediate reciprocity (Whiteley 2000).  
In essence social capital is presented as a form of informal institution, having an impact 
on the trajectory of the economy. Social capital acts as a complement to the presence of formal 
institution and as a substitute where formal institutions are at an early stage of development. 
As such we hypothesize that a high level of prevailing social capital will discourage 
politicians to act opportunistically, and hence we expect the absence of Political Budget 
Cycles in countries where the level of social capital is high. 
 
3.1 Social Capital, Trust and Economic Literature 
 
The operationalization of the concept of social capital is somehow more complicated than 
it initially seems. Sapienza et al. (2006) have argued that the opening through which culture 
entered the economic literature was the measure of trust. As such several scholars have 
proposed trust as one of the most important dimensions of social capital (Fukuyama 1995, 
Knack and Zak 2002, Francois 2002)21. In light of this interconnection, it has been accustomed 
in the economic literature to proxy the level of social capital using the level of generalized 
trust. The indicator commonly used derives from the question on trust of the World Value 
Survey (WVS)22. 
Trust and social capital, have been mostly employed to explain divergent long run growth 
paths. Several studies have examined the relationship between growth and trust suggesting a 
favorable effect of social capital on economic growth (Putnam 1993, Fukuyama 1995, Knack 
and Keefer 1997, La Porta, et al. 1997, Glaeser, et al. 2000, Knack and Zak 2002, Francois 
2002, Beugelsdijk and van Schaik 2005). The literature on social capital and trust, however, 
is not unambiguous and has been criticized for endogeneity issues as, in the long run, 
economic outcomes may as well affect the level of trust. In the short run, however, trust is a 
significantly slow adjusting variable, as it is rooted in culture, an argument supported both by 
the literature (Greif and Tabelini 2010, Algan and Cahuc 2010) and the available data on 
                                                        
21 For summarization of the literature on trust refer to Beugelsdijk and Maseland (2011) 
22 For a detailed explanation please refer to the Appendix section 8.1.2. 
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trust23. As such it cannot be influenced by short-term fluctuations. Therefore we assume trust 
it to be strictly exogenous in the short-run 24. 
To sum up, trust has been argued to be one of the most important dimensions of social 
capital and the only one that has been operationalized. As a consequence the literature, with 
respect to trust, has been in the center of intense interest providing a way to incorporate 
cultural and societal characteristic as determinant of economic outcomes. 
 
3.2 The Effects of Social Capital on Governance and the Occurrence of Political Cycles 
 
In the economic literature, the interrelationship between political regimes, social capital 
and economic performance has not been thoroughly examined. Thus, most of the literature 
concerning this puzzling relationship is derived from the political science literature. In 
essence, the link is constituted through the effects of social capital on the efficiency of 
governance. 
Boix and Posner (1998) argue that along with the between-agent cooperation, social capital 
enhances the performance of governments and formal institutions. A series of concepts can 
be utilized to rationalize this argument. Firstly, they argue that high level of social capital 
leads to rational voters that punish underperforming governments. The presence of rational 
voters has been a core assumption in recent formal models which is at stark contrast with the 
political science literature. However, as Boix and Posner argue, a rational electorate will have 
preferences that will enforce civic virtue, which is described as a shift from particularized 
interest to common interest. This is a crucial point that allows us to use the concept of social 
capital consistently with the economic rationality concept25 and extrapolate the irrationality 
to differences of preferences. In detail, based on Boix and Posner’s arguments, there are 
distinctly different interests between low and high social capital agents, as low social capital 
agents have an increased particularized interest leading to more short term and personal focus. 
In the context of a more formal economic model low social capital agents will be interested 
in direct benefits, like the public goods that they enjoy, or direct costs, like the taxes that they 
pay, but at the same time will highly discount generalized costs as amount of debt issued in 
order to provide the public goods at question. On the other hand high social capital agents will 
equally weight both personal and generalized costs. Thus, the concept of irrationality of voters 
from political literature can be transferred into the economic literature, by translating it into 
distinct preferences.  
In the context of Political Budget Cycles, low social capital citizens will be more prone to 
accommodate a manipulation in the pre-election period in the presence of information 
asymmetries. More precisely, both types of voters, low and high social capital ones, are 
rational in the sense that they want to elect the most competent politician. The competence is 
judged, in line with the literature, based on the amount of public goods the policy maker is 
able to provide but they penalize him for the cost as depicted on the level of taxes and the debt 
issued. However, voters have different competence assessment functions as low social capital 
voters highly discount the debt and pay more attention to direct benefits and cost. Thus 
depending if the ratio of low to high social capital voters is sufficiently high the incumbent 
will have an incentive to undertake a pre-election fiscal expansion, either by reducing taxes 
or increasing public goods financed by issuing new debt. Alternatively if the prevailing level 
of social capital is high, there will be no incentive for the incumbent to undertake new debt 
                                                        
23 The correlation between the different waves of the WVS is around 90 per cent. 
24 A more detailed explanation of how we are trying to tackle the issue of endogeneity is described in the appendix 
25 As we will demonstrate in the theoretical model which is presented in the next section, based on Shi and 
Svenssen’s model. 
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and manipulate the economy, since it will not yield him a higher probability of re-election. 
These assumptions are more in line with anecdotal evidence in comparison to the previous 
literature that assumes that voters were uninformed of the new debt because of the absence 
and the freedom of press. In contrast, looking especially on developed countries where the 
presence of free press is a given, we still encounter voters that will tend to ignore the provided 
information. To conclude we expect a conditional appearance of political budget cycles only 
in countries with a low prevailing level of social capital26. 
 
 
4. A Formal Model of Political Budget Cycles Conditional on Social Capital 
 
The model that we will describe is based on Shi and Svensson (2002, 2006). We will 
slightly adapt it to accommodate for two different kinds of voters based on the level of social 
capital. Its origins can be traced back to Rogoff (1990), however, it is a moral hazard model. 
We will follow the notation of Shi and Svensson and where changes are made will be 
explicitly stated.  
 
4.1. The Model 
 
As in the model of Shi and Svensson the economy is composed by a large number of voters 
and two parties denoted with the subscripts α and β. The voter’s derive utility from the 
consumptions of a private goods (c) and a public good (g). Explicitly the utility function for 
person i in period t can be stated as: 
 
            𝑈𝑡
𝑖,𝑆𝐶 = ∑ 𝜌𝑠𝑐
𝑛−𝑡
𝑇
𝑛=𝑡
[𝑔𝑛 + 𝑢(𝑐𝑛) + 𝑏
𝑖𝑧𝑠]                                                                                (1) 
 
where ρ is a discount factor, b is a specific voters bias towards candidate α or candidate β and 
z is  binary variable that takes the value -1/2 if candidate α is elected and 1/2 if candidate β is 
elected. Thus we also assume that each voter derives utility if the candidate that he likes is 
elected. Additionally, we assume that the voters are uniformly distributed on [- ½ , ½ ] and 
there is not a general bias towards any of the candidates. However, unlike Shi and Svensson, 
we do not assume a uniform discount factor across voters. There is a discrete difference in the 
discount factor of low and high social capital citizens. A low social capital citizen will tend 
to have a higher discount rate for future consumption. Conversely the discount factor of the 
high social capital citizens for simplicity will be closer to 127. The private consumption 
function of the voters consists of an exogenous income component (y) minus a lump sum tax 
(τ) that is used for the provision of the public good: 
 
            𝑐𝑡 = 𝑦 − 𝜏𝑡                                                                                                                                (2) 
 
 
                                                        
26 That does not mean that in all low social capital countries we expect to find a significant present of Political 
Budget Cycles, but rather that we expect not to find evidence in high social capital ones. Having said that as we 
will demonstrate in the empirical part there is both evidence for the absence of PBC in high social capital countries 
and the presence in low ones. 
27 This explicit difference will reflect voters debt preference and lead to an initial equilibrium condition different 
than the one in Shi and Svenssons model as debt will be issued even in the non-election years. 
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On the contrary politicians derive additional utility from “ego rents” as has been assumed by 
Rogoff (1990). Unlike Shi and Svenssen we assume that this can be rationalized from non-
monetary benefits and not so much the ability to misuse the office for private gains. The 
candidate’s utility function is equal to: 
 
            𝑉𝑡
𝑗 = ∑ 𝜌𝑛−𝑡
𝑇
𝑛=𝑡
[𝑔𝑛 + 𝑢(𝑐𝑛) + 𝑋𝑛]                                                                                     (3) 
 
where the j is either candidate α or β.  
There are two distinct periods, an election year t and a pre-election year. According to Shi 
and Svenssen’s assumptions candidates produce the amount of the public good they provide, 
based on the amount of taxes (τt) they receive and the debt (dt) they issue. Additionally they 
have a level of competence (ηt
j) which allows them to provide more efficiently leading to a 
higher amount of public goods. The higher the level of competence, the higher the amount of 
public good they will produce, given the level of taxes and debt.  The level of competence is 
not stable through time and changes, based on a first order moving average process: 
 
            𝜂𝑡
𝑗 = 𝜇𝑡
𝑗 − 𝜇𝑡−1
𝑗                                                                                                                          (4) 
 
where μ is independent and identically distributed random variable with a mean of zero and 
finite variance28. Another assumption made by Shi and Svenssen is that all past competence 
shocks are known to all voters and parties, however, as in older versions of the model, the 
incumbents is unsure about the his competence (ηt)  at the time he decides for the level of 
taxes (τt) and the debt (dt). Furthermore, borrowing is costly and there exists a continuous cost 
function of borrowing R(d) with R(0)=0. In our model, and given the fact that we assumed a 
discount rate unequal to zero, we also assume that R’(0) is a finite number equal to the 
weighted average discount rate prevailing it the country29. Putting all pieces together the 
production of the public good in year t is defined as: 
 
            𝑔𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑅(𝑑𝑡−1) + 𝜂𝑡
𝑗                                                                                               (5) 
 
On the contrary to Shi and Svenssen’s model we do not assume that voters have access to 
different information and all voters can observe the same variables. This is a rational 
assumption especially with respect to developed countries as information is publicly 
available, although we still observe the tendency of some part of the voter to ignore this 
information. We assume that this is based on their level of social capital and thus preferences. 
Additionally the argument that is used by Shi Svenssen, that the government is using 
accounting techniques to hide the deficit, does explain how debt can be unobservable but at 
the same time creates a contradiction, because in their model it is stated that a considerable 
part of the society observes these governmental strategy, thus assuming that they can, on a 
personal level, uncover this accounting techniques fallacy. Thus, we argue that information is 
there for whoever needs to observe it, however in the case of low social capital voters require 
more cost, than the relative weight they assign to the importance, due to short term biased 
preferences. Accordingly we assume that a percentage (SC) of the voters with high level of 
social capital on the one hand will take into account, both the level of the public good (gt) and 
                                                        
28 the distribution function F(μ) and a f(0)>0 
29 R’’(d)>0 for all d thus we have increasing costs as the level of debt grows. 
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of taxes (τt) they pay and the debt (dt) they issued, in order to estimate the competence of the 
incumbent since their discount rate is equal to 1. On the other hand the low social capital 
voters (1-SC) will pay attention only to direct benefits to them and estimate the competence 
of the incumbent based on the level of the public good (gt) and of taxes (τt) they pay and 
discount the level of debt (dt).  
It is uninformative to solve for the model without election, as Shi and Svenssen do, since 
the random candidate that is assigned at the office will determine the optimal amount of taxes 
based on his discount rate30 and consumption ignoring the public. As such the equilibrium tax 
and deficit will be different of the one where the discount factor of the public plays a role. 
Thus we will first solve the model for the case the policy make was maximizing non-election 
years first and sequential for the election years. 
 
4.1.1. Political budget cycles 
 
In an effort to solve the model the problem can be broken down into two single period 
maximizations. The structure is as follows: every second year there is an election, in the post-
election year (t +1) given that the process for competence and past competence is observable 
in combination with the assumption that debt is increasingly costly, the policy maker will 
have no incentive to depart from the optimal deficit (d0) and tax (τ0) level31. This is driven by 
the fact that the politician can signal his competence only in the election year to manipulate 
the vote, because as we explained, past competence is observable by the voters. Furthermore, 
we assume like Shi and Svenssen that the competence shocks are uncorrelated with each other. 
Finally given the fact that debt is costly, the incumbent will try to run a quasi-surplus to pay 
any deficit excessing the optimal level and thus the production of the public good in the post-
election year is: 
 
            𝑔𝑡+1 = 𝜏0 − (𝑅(𝑑𝑡) − 𝑑0) + 𝜂𝑡+1                                                                                     (6) 
 
 
In a parallel vein we have the same behavior for the period t – 1. On the contrary the budget 
constrain for the election year t is: 
 
            𝑔𝑡 = 𝜏0 + 𝑑0 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡                                                                                                           (7) 
 
It is important here to note that in contrast with the model of Shi and Svenssen we have d0 
appearing as we assume that there will be an optimal level of deficit in equilibrium, even 
without the manipulation incentive, given the assumption of the discounting of a portion of 
the population, the low social capital citizens. That does not mean that the deficit will explode, 
as the fact that debt is costly and the presence of the high social capital citizen ensure the 
existence of an optimal point. 
The election outcome will be determined based on the expectation of the candidate with 
the highest competence. In other words voters will estimate competence based on the best 
expected outcome for the post-election year. Thus they form expectations, given their 
preferences, and vote rationally. By assuming that candidate α is in office in period t we also 
                                                        
30 In their model the two discount rate coincide which in not the case in our version as the low social capital voters 
have a high discount rate and thus a preference for more debt. 
31 The optimal deficit and tax levels are the ones that arise if we solve the maximization problem of the politician 
based for the equilibrium debt given the incumbent was maximizing over infinity without the presence of elections 
and his discount rate equal to the average of the society. 
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denote by d* the excess deficit he will issue to be determined in equilibrium. Thus the 
expected outcome if the incumbent is re-elected is: 
 
            𝜏𝑡+1 = 𝜏0                                                                                                                                    (8) 
 
            𝑑𝑡+1 = 𝑑0 − 𝑅(𝑑𝑡
∗)                                                                                                                  (9) 
 
           𝛦𝑡[ 𝑔𝑡+1
𝑎 ] = 𝜏0 − 𝐸[𝑅(𝑑𝑡
∗)] + 𝑑0 + 𝛦[𝜇𝑡
𝑎]                                                                       (10) 
 
since E [μ t +1 ] = 0 and thus drops out form equation (10). Simultaneously the expected 
outcome if the candidate β is elected is: 
 
            𝜏𝑡+1 = 𝜏0                                                                                                                                 (11) 
 
            𝑑𝑡+1 = 𝑑0 − 𝑅(𝑑𝑡
∗)                                                                                                               (12) 
 
           𝛦𝑡[ 𝑔𝑡+1
𝑎 ] = 𝜏0 − 𝐸[𝑅(𝑑𝑡
∗)] + 𝑑0                                                                                        (13) 
 
Note that the expectation for the competence drops out, as both components are equal to zero 
because a) there is no past observation and b) the future one has a mean expected value of 
zero. Looking at equations (10) and (13) we can infer that in order the incumbent to win the 
election the following in equality has to hold: 
 
           𝛦𝑡[ 𝜇𝑡
𝛼] − 𝑏𝑖 ≥ 0                                                                                                                     (14) 
 
This result is rational as the voters will vote the candidate that is not of their liking if, and 
only if, the expected benefit exceeds the party bias. As we made explicit before all voters have 
the same information32 but different abilities or preferences during the assessment. In detail 
the high social capital voters (SC) will take into account both direct and indirect benefits, thus 
they will care both for the observable public good (gt) and the taxes (τt) they paid and the 
general new debt (dt) issued by the incumbent. Thus a high social capital voter based on 
equation (4) and (7) will find the true competence of the incumbent: 
 
            𝜇𝑡
𝛼   = 𝑔𝑡 − 𝜏0 − 𝑑0 − 𝑑𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡−1                                                                                      (15) 
  
On the contrary low social capital voters (1-SC) will care mostly for the direct benefits 
they observe or paid the election year and discount the indirect ones. In essence we are just 
imposing a high discount rate on the new deficit to solve for the solution. However, to be 
consistent, also in the past they used to underestimate the debt issued so their actual estimate 
of competence will be in essence incremental and as such they will subtract implicitly the 
equilibrium deficit, and he will estimate the competence as follows: 
 
            𝜇𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑤
𝛼   = 𝑔𝑡 − 𝜏0 − 𝑑0 − 𝜇𝑡−1 − 𝑑𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑤 =  𝜇𝑡
𝛼 + 𝑑𝑡  − 𝑑𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑤                                    (16) 
  
                                                        
32 In contradiction with Shi and Svenssen where a part of voters has information about the debt and another part 
does not. 
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Now that we derived the competence assessment functions we can first use equation (13) 
in combination with the assumption about bi to derive the votes share of candidate α to derive 
his expected share of votes as: 
 
          Pr(𝛦𝑡[ 𝜇𝑡
𝛼] − 𝑏𝑖 ≥ 0  ) = 𝛦𝑡[ 𝜇𝑡
𝛼] +
1
2
                                                                               (17) 
 
Thus using the competence assessment functions of the two types of voters we can find 
the probability that candidate α has a majority in popular vote as: 
 
          𝑃𝑡 = Pr (𝜎 [ 𝜇𝑡
𝛼 +
1
2
] + (1 − 𝑆𝐶) [ 𝜇𝑡
𝛼 + 𝑑𝑡  − 𝑑𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑤 +
1
2
] ≥
1
2
)                                          
               =  Pr ( 𝜇𝑡
𝛼 ≥  (1 − 𝑆𝐶)(𝑑𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑑𝑡  ) = 1 − 𝐹 ((1 − 𝑆𝐶)(𝑑𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑑𝑡  ))         (18) 
 
Finally, as Shi and Svenssen state, the incumbent will maximize his expected utility over 
the two periods with respect to the amount of new debt he is willing to undertake. Given the 
optimal solution for deficit and taxes we have: 
 
            max
𝑑𝑡
𝐸𝑡[ 𝜏0 + 𝑑0 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡
𝛼 + 𝑢(𝑦 − 𝜏0) + 𝛸]                                                                         
                     +𝐸𝑡 [1 − 𝐹 ((1 − 𝑆𝐶)(𝑑𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑑𝑡   ))] [𝜏0 + 𝑑0 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡
𝛼 + 𝑢(𝑦 − 𝜏0) + 𝛸]  
                      +𝐸𝑡 [𝐹 ((1 − 𝑆𝐶)(𝑑𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑑𝑡  ))] [𝜏0 + 𝑑0 + 𝑑𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡
𝛼 + 𝑢(𝑦 − 𝜏0)]           (19) 
 
And the first-order condition is: 
 
            1 + (1 − 𝑆𝐶)𝐹′ ((1 − 𝑆𝐶)(𝑑𝑡,𝑙𝑜𝑤 − 𝑑𝑡)) 𝛸 − 𝑅
′(𝑑𝑡) ≤  0                                        (20) 
 
In equilibrium though the incumbents optimal choice must be consistent with the 
expectations of the voters and as such dt
*=dt=dt,low . Thus as in the model of Shi and Svenssen 
the equilibrium condition holds as an equality. One notable difference is that in our case dt
* 
refers to the incremental debt issued at the election year above the equilibrium deficit d0. 
Hence we have: 
 
            1 + (1 − 𝑆𝐶)𝑓(0)𝛸 − 𝑅′(𝑑𝑡
∗) =  0                                                                                   (21) 
 
where the dt
*>033. By the means of comparative statics we can derive that: 
 
            
𝜕𝑑𝑡
∗
𝜕𝑆𝐶
< 0,
𝜕𝑑𝑡
∗
𝜕𝛸
 > 0                                                                                                        (22) 
 
At this point we will summarize the general conclusions we can derive from the model we 
just presented. First and foremost, the higher the percentage of high social capital voters the 
lower the incentive to increase the deficit in the election year. Furthermore, the incentives of 
the manipulation will depend positively on the amount of “ego rents” (X), that the incumbent 
derives from being in office. Another conclusion that we can derive is that due to the higher 
                                                        
33 Note that f(0)>0 
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discount factor of the low social capital voter there will be an equilibrium deficit that is, on 
average, higher in countries with high percentage of low social capital voters. 
 
  
5. Empirical Analysis 
 
5.1. The Econometric Model 
 
Based on the theoretical interrelation of social capital and governance we expect the 
presence of Political Budget Cycles to be conditional on the level of social capital. To test this 
hypothesis we will utilize an econometric specification very familiar form the recent literature 
of Political Budget Cycles. First we will use a panel fixed effect model with one lag of the 
dependent variable similar to the model used by Brender and Drazen (2005): 
 
            𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ αn𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑛 + 𝛄
′𝐱i,t
𝑛
1
+ 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                   (23) 
 
where yi,t  is a fiscal indicator, in our case we will use the budget balance defined as the 
difference between total revenue and grants minus total expenditure, for the country i the and 
year t, xi,t are the economic control variables used by the literature (Persson and Tabellini 
2002, Brender and Drazen 2005). ELECTi,t is an election dummy taking the value of one 
during election year t for the country i and zero otherwise. Finally ξi is the country’s fixed 
effect included. The economic controls included are the log of GDP per capita, the output gap 
as proxied with the use of a Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter, the population share above the 
age of 65, the population share between 15-64 and the trade share as percentage of the GDP34. 
Furthermore n in this case is equal to 1, as only one lag of the balance will be included in the 
fixed effects model. This baseline model will be estimated in separate regressions for high 
and low social capital countries, proxied by the level of trust and using the median value of 
the sample countries to create the separation. Additionally we will define a model that 
includes an interaction term with social capital and the elections dummy: 
 
            𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ αn𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑛 + 𝛄
′𝐱i,t
𝑛
1
+ 𝛽1𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖,𝑡) + 𝜉𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (24) 
 
SCi,t is the level of social capital prevailing in the country. Social capital will not be included 
as a separate term due to perfect multi-colinearity, as we keep it constant through time and as 
such it is a linear multiple of the country constants. The model will be estimated using both a 
dummy of social capital and the level. In the dummy specification the election dummy 
captures the election effect on balance in low social capital countries, which we expect to be 
negative and significant. The interaction term captures the difference of the effects on fiscal 
balance during election years between low and high social capital countries, and as such we 
expect it to be positive and significant. Additionally we expect the two effects to sum to zero 
as we assumed that in high social capital countries no Political Budget Cycle will be 
observable. To test this hypothesis more explicitly we will initially run separate regressions 
for low and high social capital group of the countries35. Additionally, in the level specification, 
                                                        
34 For information about the variables and the data please refer to section 8.1 in the Appendix 
35 Using model (23). 
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the effect of the election on the budget balance is conditional on the level of social capital and 
the interaction coefficient alone provides little information, thus we will graph the marginal 
effects following the methodology of Brambor et al. (2006). In any case we expect the effect 
of social capital to be positive as social capital increases and t in effect makes the presence of 
Political Budget Cycle statistically insignificant for high value of social capital. In section 5.3 
we will perform tests to ensure that our results are robust against other conditional variables 
in the literature. We will therefore introduce two dummies capturing election years in low and 
high social capital countries and drop the non-interacted election dummy in order to make our 
model more easily comparable in conditional regressions, however level specification will 
remain the same.  
Our econometric model utilizes a dynamic panel specification, in which the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable introduces a potential bias in the OLS estimator. The bias arises 
from the fact that initial condition of the dependent variable is by definition correlated with 
country fixed effect and thus the lagged dependent is correlated with the error term, even if 
there is no serial correlation of the error term (Nickell 1981). The bias is thought to be of the 
order 1/T where T is the time dimension of the panel. Hence, the larger the panel, the more 
negligible the size of the bias. In our case we are utilizing a panel of 63 countries over a period 
of 41 years, from 1960 to 200136. As the number of years is considerably large we can assume 
that the bias will be rather small. Furthermore in the presence of possible serial correlation of 
the error term the strict erogeneity assumption will be violated and the results might be biased. 
For the aforementioned reasons we will additionally estimate our model using the Two-Stage 
System GMM estimator that was developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998)37. The method is based on the method of Arellano and Bond, where higher order 
lags are used to instrument the lag dependent variable. Simultaneously it assumes that the 
panel-level effect is unrelated to the first observable first-difference of the dependent variable 
and as such using additional moment conditions in which the lagged differences of the 
dependent variable are orthogonal to the level of the errors. In the case of the GMM estimation 
we will use two lags of the dependent variable. In the GMM estimates we will provide the 
Arrellano and Bonds ar(1) and ar(2) tests as well as the Hansen test. For both, the fixed effects 
and GMM model, we will use robust standard errors because of the presence of 
heteroskedasticity38. Especially in the case of the System GMM the normal standard error 
tends to be severely downward biased and thus we will use the Windmeijer (2005) corrected 
standard error. Finally, we also tested for the presence of a unit root, which was proven to be 
the case, however there exists co-integration which allows us to proceed with the estimation39. 
 
 
                                                        
36 The data are the same used by Bremder and Drazen (2005). 
37 Based on the initial GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991) 
38 Please refer to the appendix section 8.3 for further analysis.  
39 For all the relevant tests please refer to the appendix. 
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5.2.  Estimation and Results 
 
The models, as specified in the previous section, are estimated sequentially. In this section 
we will estimate the model based on the fixed effects specification and in the section 5.4 we 
will estimate them using GMM. Furthermore, we will firstly divide our sample and perform 
separate regressions in order to show that the significance of the Political Budget Balance is 
driven by the low social capital democracies. In a next step we will estimate the model 
including the interaction term, between elections and high social capital, both using a dummy 
and a level for social capital. As we already mentioned for the level specification we will 
graph the marginal effects using the methodology of Brambor et al. (2006) . 
 
5.2.1.  Separate regressions for high and low social capital democracies 
 
The results of the estimation are reported in table 1. In the first column we report the 
estimation of the model for the full sample of countries. During the whole analysis we will 
refrain from commenting on the results for the control variables and we will focus only on the 
variables of interest in our model. From the estimation of the whole sample we can easily 
observe that the election dummy proves to be significant at 1% significance level, a result 
similar to the rest of the literature. The sign of the coefficient estimate is negative and  
 
Table 1 Electoral Effects on Budget Balance in  Democracies Separated by the Level of Social Capital 
Dependent variable Balance as percent of GDP 
Panel Fixed Effectsa – Separate Regressions based on Dummies 
 [1] All Countries  [2] Low Social Capital  [3] High Social Capital  
 ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽   ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽  ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽  
Electionb -0.3369*** (0.1364)  -0.8064*** (0.2911)  -0.0648 (0.1120)  
Lagged Balancec   0.6088*** (0.0609)  -0.4877*** (0.0865)   0.7891*** (0.0189)  
Log(rGDPpc)d  0.3477  (0.2884)   0.8362*  (0.4918)   0.1674 (0.2677)  
Output Gape  0.2164*** (0.0480)   0.2013*** (0.0661)   0.2625*** (0.0649)  
Population above 65 -0.1975** (0.0960)  -0.2912 (0.1926)  -0.0335 (0.0759)  
Population 15-64  0.0507 (0.0480)  -0.0048 (0.0821)   0.0455 (0.0390)  
Tradef -0.0015 (0.0061)  -0.0014 (0.0109)   0.0031 (0.0059)  
Constant -5.8605*** (2.0312)  -7.0660* (3.8475)  -5.4691*** (1.7246)  
          
Countries 63   32  31  
Observations 1762   779  983  
R2 0.58   0.43  0.80  
a Notes: The model is estimated using a  fixed effects panel regression with balance as a dependent variable. * denotes 
significance at the 10 percent level. ** at the 5 percent level. *** at the 1 percent level. β’s are the coefficients and σβ are the 
cluster robust standard errors. 
b Dummy variable taking the value of 1 at election years and 0 otherwise. 
    c The first lag of the dependent variable, due to possible Nickell (1981) bias issues we repeat the regression using Arellano 
and Bover (1995)  and Blundell and Bond (1998)  methodology in the robustness section.  
d Log of real Gross Domestic Product per Capital 
e Calculated using Hodrick- Prescott filter (1997) for each individual country based on the trend. 
    f Trade as percentage of GDP 
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Figure 1 Coefficient estimates of elections dummy on separate country-by-country OLS regressions separated by 
high and low social capital  
 
since it estimates the change in the balance during elections years it shows that there is a 
tendency to reduce the fiscal budget balance in election years. 
In the second and third columns we report the results from two separate regressions for the 
low and high social capital countries. Comparing the estimates for the election dummy across 
the three columns we see that the observable effect seems to be driven by the low social capital 
countries or to put it another way we find no significant effect of elections on balance in high 
social capital countries. The results are fully in line with our hypothesis given the absence of 
evidence for the existence of electoral effects on balance in high social capital countries. The 
coefficient estimate reported for the election dummy, in the case for high social capital, is 
very close to zero and insignificant. Moreover we observe a large difference40 in comparison 
to the coefficient for low social capital countries which is negative and significant at the 1% 
significance level. 
Furthermore, in order to visualize the difference we estimated the election effect on 
balance for all the countries in the sample with country-by-country OLS regression, gathered 
and graphed the coefficient estimates in figure 1. We can observe that the coefficient estimates 
for countries with high social capital look more as randomly distributed around zero. On the 
contrary, for the low social capital countries we see that the distribution is more skewed 
towards negative values. Even if we remove the extreme cases of Bulgaria and Nicaragua we 
can still observe a negative bias. At this point we have to note again that the separation of the 
countries into low and high social capital countries has been done using the median value, 
thus the separation is imperfect and there are probably some countries in the middle 
misclassified. In any case the results based on the separate regressions point towards a 
significant difference and further more show that all the significance in the full sample is 
driven by countries that belong to the low social capital group. 
                                                        
40 We will test explicitly for the significance of the difference in the interaction model, however looking at the 
standard error reported a significant difference seems to exist with respect to the impact of elections in the two 
categories of countries. 
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5.2.2. Interaction model with social capital 
 
In this section we will provide the estimations for the second model, eq. 24. The results 
are reported in table 2. The first column reports the result with the social capital as a dummy 
that takes the value of 1 for high social capital countries and zero otherwise. This approach is 
very similar to the previous section, expect that this time it allows us to see if the difference 
between low and high social capital countries is significant. Furthermore the second column 
reports the estimates when we include the social capital as a level in the interaction term. First, 
with respect to the dummy specification, the election dummy captures the effect of elections 
on balance for the low social capital countries41. As expected  
                                                        
41 The estimate is very close to the first regression the small difference is due to the fact that we restrict the model 
to have a common constant for all countries. 
Table 2 Electoral Effects on Budget Balance 
Dependent variable Balance as percent of GDP 
 Panel Fixed Effectsa – Full Sample  
 [1] Dummy Specification  [2] Level Specification 
 ?̂?𝑖  ?̂?𝛽  
  𝛾𝑖  ?̂?𝛾 
 
Electionb -0.7924*** (0.2922)   -0.8723*** (0.3213)  
Election*Social Capital Dummy  0.7052** (0.3084)      
Election*Social Capital Level      1.5978** (0.7440)  
        
Lagged Balancec   0.6094*** (0.0607)    0.6085*** (0.0609)  
Log(rGDPpc)d  0.3472 (0.2898)    0.3510 (0.2881)  
Output Gape  0.2150*** (0.0479)    0.2161*** (0.0481)  
Population above 65 -0.1991** (0.0963)   -0.1988** (0.0960)  
Population 15-64  0.0526 (0.0483)    0.0517 (0.0479)  
Tradef  0.0001 (0.0062)   -0.0000 (0.0061)  
Constant -5.9710*** (2.0352)   -5.9511*** (2.0312)  
        
Countries 63   63  
Observations 1762   1762  
R2 0.59   0.59  
a Notes: The model is estimated using a  fixed effects panel regression with balance as a dependent variable. * denotes 
significance at the 10 percent level. ** at the 5 percent level. *** at the 1 percent level. β’s are the coefficients and σβ are the  
cluster robust standard errors. 
b Dummy variable taking the value of 1 at election years and 0 otherwise. 
    c The first lag of the dependent variable, due to possible Nickell (1981) bias issues we repeat the regression using  Arellano 
and Bover (1995)  and Blundell and Bond (1998)  methodology in the robustness section.  
d Log of real Gross Domestic Product per Capital 
e Calculated using Hodrick- Prescott (1997)  filter for each individual country based on the trend. 
f Trade as percentage of GDP 
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Figure 2 Marginal effect of election dummy on budget balance as the level of social capital increases for all 
countries in the sample. 
 
 
the effect of elections in the low social capital countries’ balance is negative and significant. 
Furthermore the interaction term42  captures the difference, between low and high social 
capital countries, of the election year impact on balance. The estimate is in line with our 
hypothesis, positive and significant at the 5% significance level. Additionally we observe that 
the size of the coefficient is very similar (but opposite sign) to the low social capital 
coefficient, which points to the conclusion that we derived from the separate regressions: that 
there is no significant appearance of budget cycles in high social capital countries. Thus we 
observe that a high social capital level in a country tends to reduce the possibility of an 
election budget effect. 
 Turning to the level specification, we observe a similar pattern. Furthermore using the 
level of social capital per country is less restrictive than the dummy separation. However, 
even if we observe that the interaction term is significant to be precise we need to graph the 
marginal effect. The graph of the marginal effect of elections on budget balance as the level 
of social capital increases is depicted in figure 2. The dotted line represents 95% confidence 
interval. We can easily observe that for low social capital countries the effect is negative and 
significant. Additionally as the level of social capital increases the impact of the election year 
on balance decreases and at values of social capital around 0.38 it becomes insignificant. It is 
noteworthy that the highest value of social capital in our sample is around 0.64 and the lowest 
is 0.04. At the bottom of figure 2 we also present a rug plot that shows for which values of 
social capital we have observations of elections taking place during our sample. Arguably 
there are enough observations above the level of 0.38, especially between 0.4 and 0.5, that we 
can safely conclude that the marginal effect is not becoming insignificant due to the lack of 
observations. This is also demonstrated from the fact that the  
                                                        
42 Note again that the level of social capital is not included as we already mentioned due to perfect multi-
colinearity. 
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confidence interval is very close to the marginal effect line when the whole effect becomes 
insignificant43. 
To conclude, we observe that both the dummy and the level specification suggest that the 
election effect of balance is confined mostly to low social capital countries. Furthermore we 
observe that, as the level of social capital increases the electoral effect, on balance, decreases. 
Thus, in this and the previous section we have provided some evidence for the case of the 
conditional appearance of Political Budget Cycles based on the level of social capital. 
However, and given the previous literature on conditional effects, in the next section we will 
try to test the robustness of our conclusions by comparing the sources of conditionality. 
 
5.3. Conditionality of Budget Cycles 
 
Since there are already several variables that have been proposed to have a conditional 
effect on the appearance of budget cycles, it would be faulty to ignore them. Thus in this 
section we will try to test the explanatory ability of social capital on the budget cycles, 
conditional on several other variables. Along these lines we will estimate again the models 
for developing and developed countries to check for Shi and Svenssens’ (2002) hypothesis, 
that Political Budget Cycles tend to appear mostly in developing countries. Sequentially we 
will focus on Brender and Drazens’ (2005) new and established democracies and finally we 
will repeat the estimations checking for Persson and Tabellinis’ (2000) constitutional rules. 
 
5.3.1. Social capital for developing and developed countries 
 
Shi and Svenssen (2002) argued that in a cross country setting the appearance of the 
Political Budget Cycles is mainly driven by less developed countries. We will test for this 
hypothesis with two separate methods. First we will use two dummies, one for elections in 
low social capital countries and one for election in high social capital countries, and estimate 
separate regressions for developing and developed countries. Secondly we will use the levels 
regression to graph the marginal effect as in the previous section for separately developing 
and developed countries. 
The rationale behind creating two dummies is that we want show that the election effect 
for low social capital countries is significant for both developed and developing countries. 
The downside of this procedure, also used by Brender and Drazen (2005), is that because in 
essence it splits the sample into subsamples, it is prone to type II error. At the same time 
though, when a coefficient turns out to be significant the conclusion is stronger due to the 
reduced sample. In light of that it is important to report the observations per category given  
Table 4 Electoral Effects on Budget Balance: Developing versus Developed Countries and Social Capital 
                                                        
43 However we should note that this is also due to the less variability of outcomes as demonstrated in figure 1. 
Table 3 Developed and Developing Countries Grouped Using Social Capital  
Level of Social Capital 
 Countries and Observations per Category  
  Developing Countries  Developed Countries 
  Countries Observations  Countries Observations 
High Social Capital  11 248  20 735 
Low Social Capital  28 663  4 116 
O. Kouvavas 
 
 
22 
Dependent variable Balance as percent of GDP 
Panel Fixed Effectsa – Separate Regressions based on Dummies 
 [1] All Countries  [2] Developing  [3] Developed  
 𝑐 ?̂?𝛽   ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽  ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽  
Election*Low Social Cap.b -0.7925*** (0.2922)  -0.6925** (0.3385)  -1.2928*** (0.2923)  
Election*High Social Cap.b -0.0872 (0.1043)  -0.1083 (0.2001)  -0.0755 (0.1296)  
Lagged Balancec   0.6094*** (0.0607)   0.4883*** (0.0845)   0.7741*** (0.0203)  
Log(rGDPpc)d  0.3472 (0.2898)   0.2055 (0.4897)   0.4428 (0.3206)  
Output Gape  0.2148*** (0.0479)   0.1263** (0.0508)   0.4384*** (0.0873)  
Population above 65 -0.1991** (0.0963)  -0.1993 (0.2647)   0.0338 (0.0985)  
Population 15-64  0.0526 (0.0483)   0.0790 (0.0769)   0.0054 (0.0474)  
Tradef  0.0001 (0.0062)   0.0056 (0.0093)  -0.0024 (0.0070)  
Constant -5.9710*** (2.0352)  -6.8799** (2.7437)  -6.5560** (2.4069)  
          
Countries 63   39  24  
Observations 1762   911  851  
R2 0.59   0.46  0.82  
a Notes: The model is estimated using a  fixed effects panel regression with balance as a dependent variable. * denotes 
significance at the 10 percent level. ** at the 5 percent level. *** at the 1 percent level. β’s are the coefficients and σβ are the 
cluster robust standard errors. 
b Dummy variable taking the value of 1 at election years and 0 otherwise. 
    c The first lag of the dependent variable, due to possible Nickell (1981) bias issues we repeat the regression using Arellano 
and Bover (1995)  and Blundell and Bond (1998) methodology in the A9 table of the Appendix, discussed in the robustness 
analysis section.  
d Log of real Gross Domestic Product per Capital 
e Calculated using Hodrick- Prescott (1997) filter for each individual country based on the trend. 
   f Trade as percentage of GDP 
 
 
 
the level of social capital and the degree of development. In table 3 we report the amount of 
countries and observations per category. We can observe that most low social capital countries 
are concentrated in the developing countries and thus if our hypothesis is correct the effect 
observed by Shi and Svenssen (2006) was driven mainly by this concentration. The results of 
the separate regressions, under the two-dummy configurations, are reported in table 4. In the 
first column we report the results for the full sample and in the second and third column for 
developing and developed countries respectively. First, with respect to the full sample we can 
observe that only the low social capital election dummy is significant, a result in line with the 
conclusions of the previous section. Comparing column two and three with the results for the 
full sample we notice that the same pattern continues. In both cases only the low social capital 
election dummy is significant and negative. Furthermore, by looking at the size of the 
coefficients we can indeed argue that, in the case of developing countries, it is the low social 
capital countries that drive the pattern that was noticed by Shi and Svenssen. On the contrary 
the high social capital developing countries44 do not seem to  
                                                        
44 In the separate country-by-country regression almost none of the countries classified as high social capital 
developing countries had a negative and significant coefficient. Furthermore there were countries where elections 
had a positive and significant effect like Guatemala. Overall, the effects where all very close to zero. With the only 
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Figure 3 Marginal effects of election dummy on budget balance as the level of social capital increases for 
a)developing countries and b)developed countries. 
 
 
experience a significant Political Budget Cycles effect. Even more interestingly, when we 
look at the case of developed countries, the coefficient for low social capital countries45 is still 
negative and significant at 1% level. As  such  we  can  conclude  that the appearance of  
Table 5 New and Established Democracies and Social Capital  
                                                        
noticeable exception of Pakistan, which is probably misclassified due to the use of the median value of social 
capital as a classifier. Pakistan has a value of social capital of  0.25 with the median at 0.249.  
45 There are only four low social capital and developed countries namely Greece, Turkey, Portugal and France. 
Note that used the same classification as developing and developed countries as in Brender and Drazen (2005), 
thus although debatable we kept Turkey into developed countries. Even without Turkey though the results are still 
significant. 
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New and Old Democracies Based on Drazen (2004) 
 Countries and Observations per Category  
  New Democracies  Old Democracies 
  Countries Observations  Countries Observations 
High Social Capital  11 254  20 729 
Low Social Capital  23 492  9 287 
 
 
Political Budget Cycles is not confined only to developing countries. Additionally, we can 
observe that the election dummy for high social capital countries remains insignificant for all 
three separate regressions. The GMM estimates of table 4 using Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998) are reported in table A9 in the appendix. The results are fairly 
robust, even after the Windmeijer (2005) error correction. 
Up until now, the analysis was based on the separation between low and high social capital 
countries, based on the dummies we have created. However, it would be interesting to test the 
robustness of the results using the level of social capital in the interaction term. The 
information of the levels regression can be summarized in the graphs of the two marginal 
effects of elections on balance for the cases of developing and developed countries conditional 
on the level of social capital46. The two graphs are depicted in figure 3. On the upper panel of 
the figure we provide the marginal effect for developing countries and on the lower panel for 
developed.  We observe that in both cases the graph looks similar to figure 1, since the effect 
starts as negative and significant and it becomes insignificant for higher values of social 
capital. In any case, we see that there is significant marginal effect even for developed 
countries as long as the value of social capital is low. It is even more interesting to focus on 
the developing countries where we see that the effect quickly become insignificant since it is 
only the countries with  very low social  capital that  account  for  the effect. This is an 
indication that higher values of social capital are more important in developing countries. This 
effect can be rationalized by thinking of social capital as an informal institution of which the 
function is more important where the formal ones are not present. 
To sum up, for the conditional analysis on developed and developing countries we can 
conclude that there is suggestive evidence that Political Budget Cycles are only present in low 
social capital countries irrespective if they are developed or developing. In the next two 
sections we will proceed in the same way controlling for new and old democracies and 
constitutional rules. 
 
5.3.2. Social Capital for New and Established Democracies 
 
In their study Brender and Drazen (2005) assume that the significant effect of Political 
Budget Cycles in the multi-country empirical literature is due to a learning effect that occurs 
in new democracies. In essence they argue that as long as a democracy is new, voters tend to 
be inexperienced and thus budget cycles occur. This assumption is not in contradiction with 
our own, since we argue that indeed there is a voters’ effect that drives the conditionality of 
budget cycles, based on the level of social capital. However, we observe in table 5 that the 
separation of the sample has some distinct differences since we  find  that almost 1/3 of new  
Table 6 Electoral Effects on Budget Balance: New versus Established Democracies and Social Capital 
                                                        
46 The coefficient estimates for the levels regression are reported in the Appendix in section 8.4 table A6. 
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Dependent variable Balance as percent of GDP 
Panel Fixed Effectsa – Separate Regressions based on Dummies 
 [1] All Democracies  [2] New Democracies  [3] Old Democracies  
 𝑐 ?̂?𝛽   ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽  ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽  
Election*Low Social Cap.b -0.7925*** (0.2922)  -1.2751*** (0.4254)  -0.0506 (0.2402)  
Election*High Social Cap.b -0.0872 (0.1043)  -0.2359 (0.1898)  -0.0644 (0.1247)  
Lagged Balancec   0.6094*** (0.0607)   0.3921*** (0.1141)   0.7310*** (0.0034)  
Log(rGDPpc)d  0.3472 (0.2898)  -0.2681 (0.5775)   0.4575 (0.2743)  
Output Gape  0.2148*** (0.0479)   0.2062*** (0.0671)   0.2819*** (0.0738)  
Population above 65 -0.1991** (0.0963)  -0.3002 (0.1978)  -0.0941 (0.0881)  
Population 15-64  0.0526 (0.0483)   0.2417** (0.1047)   0.0016 (0.0424)  
Tradef  0.0001 (0.0062)  -0.0170 (0.0138)   0.0050 (0.0043)  
Constant -5.9710*** (2.0352)  -11.115*** (3.9659)  -5.0864** (2.2912)  
          
Countries 63   34  29  
Observations 1762   746  1016  
R2 0.59   0.35  0.72  
a Notes: The model is estimated using a  fixed effects panel regression with balance as a dependent variable. * denotes 
significance at the 10 percent level. ** at the 5 percent level. *** at the 1 percent level. β’s are the coefficients and σβ are the 
cluster robust standard errors. 
b Dummy variable taking the value of 1 at election years and 0 otherwise. 
    c The first lag of the dependent variable, due to possible Nickell (1981) bias issues we repeat the regression using Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) methodology A9 table of the Appendix, discussed in the robustness analysis 
section.   
d Log of real Gross Domestic Product per Capital 
e Calculated using Hodrick- Prescott (1997) filter for each individual country based on the trend. 
   f Trade as percentage of GDP 
 
 
democracies have a high social capital. Thus, it would be interesting to test for two 
hypotheses: firstly, if the effect found in new democracies is robust for high social capital 
ones and secondly, if we can trace a budget cycle effect in low-social capital old-democracies. 
The analysis will be structured as in the previous section. 
The results of the separate two-dummy regressions are reported in Table 6. As previously, 
in the first column are the results for the full sample, and in the second and third for new and 
old democracies respectively. We can easily observe that with respect to our two hypotheses 
the results are mixed. In the second column we observe that the coefficient for low social 
capital new democracies is negative and significant, however for high social capital it is 
insignificant.  This result is in favor of our first hypothesis that in the case of new democracies 
the significance is driven by only the low social capital countries. Furthermore we can observe 
that the difference between the two coefficients is fairly large and, looking at the standard 
errors, seems significant. This is fully in line with our theoretical priors that, as the level of 
social capital increases, there will be a decreased possibility of a political budget cycles to 
occur. As we argued in our theoretical model this is due to the fact that the incentives of the 
incumbent to manipulate the economy become smaller. This  hypothesis  would  have  been  
falsified  if  we had observed the occurrence of  
 
 
O. Kouvavas 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Marginal effect of election dummy on budget balance as the level of social capital increases for only 
a)new democracies or b)old decmocracies. 
 
budget cycles in the high social capital new democracies. Hence, in essence the new 
democracies separation fails to falsify our hypothesis. Conversely, by observing column 3 of 
the table, we see that both coefficients for the election dummies are insignificant. On a parallel 
way we can infer that we fail to falsify the old democracies hypothesis. More specifically we 
can say that, in contradiction to what Brender and Drazen (2005) argue there is no new 
democracies effect but mostly a lack of evidence in old democracies. Thus, we can conclude 
that there is no evidence for political budget cycles neither in high social capital countries nor 
in old democracies. To check the robustness of this conclusion we additionally regressed new 
and old democracies election dummies for only high social  capital countries and we find that 
both are insignificant 47 .The regressions of table 6 are reproduced again using GMM 
                                                        
47 The results are reported in table A7 in the Appendix. 
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estimation in table A9 of the Appendix. Nevertheless the results are almost identical to the 
fixed effects panel regression. 
For the levels specification we find results that are in line with the results of the two-
dummy analysis. The estimates for all the regression are reported in table A8 in the Appendix. 
Figure 4 depicts the graphs of the marginal effects of the election dummies on budget balance. 
In the upper panel of the figure we graph the effects for new democracies as the level of social 
capital increases. As it is readily observable a similar, familiar, pattern arises. The effect is 
only significant for lower values of social capital and it gradually decreases until it becomes 
insignificant. Hence we can see that the significance in the group of new democracies is 
indeed driven by the low social capital countries. On the contrary in the lower panel of the 
figure, we can observe that the effect is in general insignificantly different from zero.  Thus 
we see one more time that there is indeed absence of evidence for the existence of budget 
cycles in old democracies. However, when we graph the effect of new democracies in high 
social capital countries it looks the same. At this point it  is  highly 
important to draw the attention to the fact that there are only 9 low social capital old 
democracies and the failure to provide evidence might be due to a type II error as the size of 
the sample is insufficient. 
To conclude with respect to new and old democracies we find evidence that in the case of 
new democracies the significant effect is driven by the low social capital countries, however 
we fail to provide evidence that there is a significant election cycle in old democracies. Thus 
it seems that the effect described in the literature as the new democracies effect is more like 
the old democracies effect. 
 
5.3.2. Social Capital and Constitutional Rules 
 
Arguably constitutional rules are at the heart of the notion of democracy and thus set the 
stage for a functioning political system. Since different rules can affect both voters motives 
and politicians incentives in divergent ways, their impact on economic activity is a central 
question. Along these lines, Persson and Tabellini (2002) focus on different political systems 
and their pre- and post-electoral effects on fiscal policy. They categorize the countries 
according to the form of government as Presidential or Parliamentary as well as according to 
the election voting rules as Proportional or Majoritarian. Given this categorization we will try 
to test the robustness of our effect based on social capital under different forms of government 
and election voting rules. 
Persson and Tabellini argue that parliamentary systems tend to have more checks and 
balances and as such they expect to be less susceptive to fiscal manipulation. On the contrary 
in a presidential system the executive is only directly accountable to voters. Given this 
hypothesis we need to check with respect to presidential systems if political budget cycles are 
only present in low social capital countries and not in high social capital ones. Furthermore, 
we need to test if we can trace the presence of budget cycles in low social capital 
parliamentary systems. Hence, in order to estimate these effects we have created a dummy for 
the election years in countries belonging to each of the pre-specified categories. As such we 
expect to find a significant effect of the election years only in the low social capital 
Presidential and Parliamentary democracies.  
The results are reported in the first and second column of table 7. Column 1 reports the 
estimates using a panel fixed effects specification and column 2 reports  the  estimates using 
Table 7 Electoral Effects on Budget Balance: Social Capital and Constitutional Rules 
Dependent variable Balance as percent of GDP 
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Dummies Specification 
 Presidential and Parliamentary  Majoritarian and Proportional 
  [1] Fixed Effects  [2] GMM  [3] Fixed Effects  [4] GMM 
 ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽   ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽  ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽  ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽 
Elect*Parl*Lowb -0.766** (0.359)  -0.772*** (0.279)       
Elect*Parl*Highb -0.140 (0.114)  -0.178 (0.133)        
Elect*Pres*Lowb -0.806** (0.376)  -0.885** (0.377)       
Elect*Pres*Highb  0.177 (0.217)  -0.108 (0.508)       
Elect*Prop*Lowb       -0.780** (0.377)  -1.040*** (0.379) 
Elect*Prop*Highb       -0.127 (0.108)  -0.199 (0.128) 
Elect*Maj*Lowb       -0.532** (0.251)  -0.700 (0.824) 
Elect*Maj*Highb       -0.077 (0.033)  -0.305 (0.395) 
Lagged Balance  0.610*** (0.061)       0.609*** (0.061)    
Lag_1 Balancec     0.279*** (0.078)      0.285*** (0.019) 
Lag_2 Balancec    -0.029 (0.092)     -0.036 (0.080) 
Log(rGDPpc)d  0.347 (0.290)   3.780*** (1.278)   0.355 (0.289)   0.358*** (1.381) 
Output Gapf  0.215*** (0.048)   0.761*** (0.173)   0.214*** (0.048)   0.642*** (0.199) 
Population 65 -0.199** (0.096)  -0.318 (0.232)  -0.202** (0.097)  -0.338 (0.238) 
Population 15-64  0.053 (0.048)  -0.143 (0.184)   0.054 (0.048)  -0.106 (0.185) 
Tradeg  0.000 (0.006)   0.031** (0.014)   0.000 (0.006)   0.031* (0.005) 
Constant -5.968*** (2.037)  -27.26*** (10.37)  -6.071*** (2.054)  -27.11*** (10.89) 
 
           
Countries 63  63  63  63 
Obs 1762  1682  1762  1682 
Num. Instruments -  236  -  236 
Arellano-Bond Test for 
AR(1) (p-value)   
       - 
 
0.0165  -  0.0112 
Arellano-Bond Test for 
AR(2) (p-value)   
       - 
 
0.4292  -  0.4162 
Hansen Test  
(p-value) 
-  1.0000  -  1.0000 
a Notes: The models are estimated using Panel Fixed Effects or GMM based on Arellano and Bover (1995)  and Blundell 
and Bond (1998) methodology with balance as a dependent variable. * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. ** at the 
5 percent level. *** at the 1 percent level. β’s are the coefficients and σβ are the cluster robust or the Windmeijer (2005) 
corrected standard errors for the GMM. 
b Dummy variables for elections  in democracies with parliamentary, presidential, majoritarian or proportional constitutional 
rules separated by high and low social capital, taking the value of 1 at election years and 0 otherwise.  
    c Instrumented based on Arellano and Bover (1995)  and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
d Log of real Gross Domestic Product per Capital 
e Calculated using Hodrick- Prescott filter (1997) for each individual country based on the trend. 
     f Trade as percentage of GDP. 
 
the two-step GGM method of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). As 
it easily observable in both cases only the estimates of low social capital countries are 
significant and negative. On the contrary the estimates for high social capital countries are 
insignificantly different from zero irrespective of the governance system. Additionally there 
seems to be almost no difference between the sizes of the coefficients estimated for low social 
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capital countries across governance systems. The results of the GMM estimates are almost 
identical to the fixed effects with respect to the variables of interest48. Furthermore the system 
GMM is consistent as long as at least the second auto correlation test is rejects the null, which 
proves to be the case. Finally, given the results of the Hansen test, reported in the bottom of 
table 7, our instruments indeed seem to be orthogonal to error term and thus exogenous and 
valid. Along these lines our results seem to be robust across different governance systems. 
Another hypothesis of Persson and Tabellini, which is based on the political literature, is 
that majoritarian voting rules are mostly tailored to hold politicians accountable and 
proportional to keep the electorate better represented. Thus with respect to Political Budget 
Cycles majoritarian electoral rules will tend to be less prone to demonstrate election 
manipulation effects. On the contrary proportional ones are expected to show evidence of 
election year effects. In order to test these hypotheses, we use a similar strategy as with respect 
to governance systems. Moreover, in a similar manner as previously we expect only the 
election effects in the low social capital countries to turn out significant unconditional to 
election rules. 
The estimates are reported in columns 3 and 4 of table 7. First, with respect to the panel 
fixed effects estimates, we indeed observe that in both cases only the low social capital 
countries to experience an election effect on budget balance. In both cases the coefficients are 
negative and significant. However at the same time we notice that indeed the coefficient of 
democracies using majoritarian rules is smaller than the one referring to countries using 
proportional election rules. Although the difference is statistically insignificant, given the 
standard errors, it might be an indication that indeed majoritarian voting rules might have an 
impact on the election year effect. Turning to the GMM estimation we notice that, although 
the effect for low social capital proportional democracies stays robust, the coefficients of 
majoritarian ones becomes insignificant. Nevertheless it is crucial to notice that the size of the 
coefficient does not change and the loss of significance is mostly due to the increased standard 
error. In any case we observe that the effect is confined to low social capital countries and 
there is no sign of pre-election manipulation for high social capital ones. Thus even if there 
might be hints that majoritarian rules might have an effect, our main hypothesis, that in high 
capital countries we should not observe pre-election effects on fiscal policy, stays robust.  
 
5.4. Robustness Analysis 
 
During the previous sections we have estimated the models using mostly panel fixed 
effects which, given the time span of the panel, is a reasonable method49. However, and in 
effort to check the robustness of our results in this section, we will estimate the models using 
the methodology for dynamic panels of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). Therefore use of the Two-Step System GMM estimator is a fairly recent development 
in the literature of Political Budget Cycles. Earlier studies50 either use only fixed effects or 
the One-Step  Arrelano  and  Bond  (1991)  estimating  method, which is not expected to solve 
the problem if serial correlation exist. Thus we observe that the results of this studies hardly 
ever change. Thus the use of Arellano and Bover’s (1995) and Blundell and Bond’s (1998) 
improved method is becoming increasingly popular. The implicit disadvantage is that the 
method is tailored mostly for large cross-section and short time span datasets. However, in 
our case, and especially when we split our sample, the time dimension tends to become as 
                                                        
48 We observe that several of the control variables become significant and there are also notable differences in 
the estimated coefficients. 
49 Since the bias that arises from including the lag variable is of the order 1/T.  
50 See for example Bender and Drazen (2005) 
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large if not larger than the cross section. Hence the estimates are becoming increasingly more 
conservative, which is also reinforced by the fact that we use Windmeijer (2005) corrected 
standard errors. In any case we believe that it is important to check the validity of our results 
especially given the fact that there might be a serial correlation of the error term. This section 
will be structured as follows. First we will estimate our based model using separate 
regressions for low and high social capital countries. Secondly we will estimate a full sample 
model including an interaction with the dummy or the level of social capital, and graph the 
corresponding marginal effect. Finally we will estimate the models for using separate 
dummies for election years: i) for developed or developing countries, ii) for new or established 
democracies. 
Table 8 reports the estimates for the base model in separate regressions using the GMM 
estimator. In column 1 we report the estimates for low social capital countries and in column 
2 for high social capital ones. As we can observe the estimated election dummy coefficient is 
again negative and significant at the 1% level as in the fixed effects model. Additionally it is 
very close to the estimate we attained in the previous section. Furthermore, the election 
dummy coefficient for the high social capital one is again insignificantly different than zero. 
For both regression the ar(2) test does not reject the null hypothesis and in combination with 
the value of χ2 for the Hansen test terms our model valid. 
In a similar manner we report the estimation results of the models including the interaction 
term in table 9. Column 1 refers to the dummy specification and column 2 refers to the level 
one. First with respect to the model with the interaction term based on the dummy for social 
capital, we observe that both the election dummy and the interaction term are significant and 
bare the correct sign. Moreover we notice that the sum of the two terms is very close to zero, 
showing that the there is a positive effect due to high social capital, or in other words: in high 
social capital countries there is no observable Political Budget Cycle. For the levels 
specification however we can observe that the results are hardly significant, however that is 
mostly due to the use of Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. Furthermore, as we 
have previously noted for models including interaction terms with levels, it is important to 
graph the marginal effects. Thus in figure 5 we graph the marginal effect of the election 
dummy on budget balance as the level of social capital increases. The confidence interval 
depicted with the dotted line is based on the corrected robust standard errors. Once more we 
observe that the plot of the marginal effect starts negative for low values of social capital and 
increases along with the level social capital. However, for very low values of social capital 
the confidence interval is above zero and as such the effect is not statistically significant. 
Nonetheless it is readily observable that this is driven mostly by the lack of observations as 
the effect is strongly negative as opposed to the middle of the graph where the effect is very 
close to zero but still significant due to more available observations. The distribution of the 
observations is depicted in the rug plot at the bottom of the figure. In any case the graph of 
the election effect is very similar to the one based on the fixed effects estimation, however 
due to the lack of observations in the lower end of social capital in combination with the 
robust errors we cannot confidently conclude with respect to the election effect. To sum up, 
in the dummy specification we can conclude that indeed there is a positive and significant 
effect of social capital, reducing the possibility to observe an election induced budget cycle. 
On the contrary, with respect to the level specification, the  
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results are partially inconclusive since we observe the expected pattern, albeit it is statistically 
insignificant for low value of social capital. 
Finally, we test our results with respect to the conditional regressions. In order to achieve 
that we avoided to estimate separate regressions as the sample would have a significantly 
shorter cross section than time dimension and as such the GMM estimation would not be an 
ideal method. Thus we create separate election dummies for each four categories for both 
cases. Table A9 reports the results. In the first column we test for the conditional effect of 
developed or developing countries and social capital. The results of our prior analysis seem 
to be robust as again we observe an election effect only for low social capital countries 
irrespective of whether the country belongs to the developed or developing group. Moreover 
in column  2  we  perform  the  same analysis with  respect  to new or establish democracies. 
 
Table 8 Electoral Effects on Budget Balance in High and Low Social Capital Democracies 
Dependent variable Balance as percent of GDP 
 GMMa – Separate Regressions  
 [1] Low Social Capital  [2] High Social Capital 
 ?̂?𝑖   ?̂?𝛽  
  𝛾𝑖  ?̂?𝛾 
 
Electionb -0.8650*** (0.3406)   -0.0872 (0.1633)  
Lag_1 Balancec   0.3878*** (0.1115)    0.8086*** (0.0816)  
Lag_2 Balancec  0.0568 (0.1128)   -0.0626 (0.0909)  
Log(rGDPpc)d  2.1201 (3.8302)    1.7277 (1.9649)  
Output Gape  0.5172 (0.5057)    0.7555 (0.6589)  
Population  65  0.3262 (0.8163)   -0.3307 (0.8156)  
Population 15-64 -0.6004 (0.8163)    0.0905 (0.6559)  
Tradef  0.0351* (0.0185)    0.0014 (0.0141)  
Constant  10.439 (35.926)   -20.657 (33.761)  
        
Countries 32   31  
Observations 736   946  
Number of Instruments 232   230  
Arellano-Bond Test for  
AR(1) (p-value)   
0.0108 
  
0.0009 
 
Arellano-Bond Test for  
AR(2) (p-value)   
0.1600 
  
0.8553 
 
Hansen Test  
(p-value) 
1.0000 
  
1.0000 
 
a Notes: The model is estimated using  Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) methodology with balance 
as a dependent variable. * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. ** at the 5 percent level. *** at the 1 percent level. β’s 
are the coefficients and σβ are  the Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. 
b Dummy variable taking the value of 1 at election years and 0 otherwise. 
    c Instrumented based on Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  
d Log of real Gross Domestic Product per Capital 
e Calculated using Hodrick- Prescott  (1997) filter for each individual country based on the trend. 
f Trade as percentage of GDP. 
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Once more the results are identical to our initial analysis using the fixed effect estimation 
method. In both cases the ar(2) test and the Hansen test reject the null hypothesis. 
To conclude the robustness analysis, the estimations using the fixed effects model tend to 
be almost identical to the ones using the GMM estimation methods with the notable exception 
of the level interaction model specification. However, it would be reasonable to argue that the 
results of the previous sections are robust and not driven by possible underlying biases. Thus, 
although  we  have  undertaken  a  fairly conservative approach we  
 
Table 9 Electoral Effects on Budget Balance 
Dependent variable Balance as percent of GDP 
 GMMa – Full Sample  
 [1] Dummies Specification  [2] Levels Specification 
 ?̂?𝑖  ?̂?𝛽  
  𝛾𝑖  ?̂?𝛾 
 
Electionb -0.9994*** (0.3157)   -1.3804* (0.7995)  
Election*Social Capital Dummy  0.8701** (0.3579)      
Election*Social Capital Level      2.9157 (2.3008)  
        
Lag_1 Balancec  0.5568*** (0.0676)    0.5510*** (0.0646)  
Lag_2 Balancec  0.0927 (0.1032)    0.0891 (0.1026)  
Log(rGDPpc)d  1.1581  (0.1277)    1.0056 (1.1218)  
Output Gape  0.3658** (0.1466)    0.3616** (0.1452)  
Population above 65 -0.0198 (0.2316)   -0.0062 (0.1946)  
Population 15-64 -0.1291 (0.2316)   -0.0850 (0.1475)  
Tradef  0.0321** (0.0127)    0.0336*** (0.0130)  
Constant -5.7505*** (10.092)   -7.4146 (8.4578)  
        
Countries 63   63  
Observations 1682   1682  
Instruments 233   233  
Arellano-Bond Test for  
AR(1) (p-value)   
0.0029 
  
0.0029 
 
Arellano-Bond Test for  
AR(2) (p-value)   
0.1277 
  
0.1178 
 
Hansen Test  
(p-value) 
1.0000 
  
1.0000 
 
a Notes: The model is estimated using  Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)  methodology with balance 
as a dependent variable. * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. ** at the 5 percent level. *** at the 1 percent level. β’s 
are the coefficients and σβ are the Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. 
b Dummy variable taking the value of 1 at election years and 0 otherwise. 
    c Instrumented based on  Arellano and Bover (1995)  and Blundell and Bond (1998) . 
d Log of real Gross Domestic Product per Capital 
e Calculated using Hodrick- Prescott  (1997) filter for each individual country based on the trend. 
f Trade as percentage of GDP. 
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Figure 5 Marginal effect of election dummy on budget balance as the level of social capital increases for GMM 
estimation using Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. 
 
have managed to demonstrate that there is conditional effect of social capital regarding the 
appearance of Political Budget Cycles. 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
Economics is predominantly a social science and thus arguably the nature of societal 
characteristics plays a pivotal role in expected economic outcomes. Despite a few notable 
exceptions there is a striking absence of underlying civil and cultural characteristics in the 
theoretical and empirical literature of Political Budget Cycles. The very word “democracy” 
derives its origin from the Greek words “demos”, meaning people and “kratos”, meaning 
power. However voter’s characteristics tend to be ignored in the formalization of endogenous 
politics in economics.  Along these lines, this paper contributes to the literature by including 
the notion of social capital in both the theoretical and the empirical literature of Political 
Budget Cycles, in an effort to identify the underlying reasons of their conditional appearance. 
In light of the analysis conducted in the previous sections we will now focus on discussing 
the main results and conclusions that can be derived with respect to social capital and pre-
election fiscal manipulations. Hence, this section is aiming to derive and clarify possible 
conclusions. Additionally, we will devote a considerable part of the discussion on the 
limitations posed by the data and inference issues. 
There is a widespread believe in the political literature that the level of voters social capital 
will act as constrain to politician misbehaving. One can consider social capital as the glue 
between the pieces of the societies jigsaw puzzle, that keeps all the pieces together 
constraining the advance of particularized interests in expense of common ones. In that 
respect, by adjusting a known moral hazard model, we have shown that when voters focus 
only on particularized benefits, such as public goods and personal taxes and ignore general 
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ones such as public debt they implicitly open the door for fiscal manipulations. We concluded 
that the incumbent will only have an incentive to manipulate the economy when the ratio of 
low social capital voters is sufficiently high.  
In line with our theoretical priors the results from the empirical section show a clear 
interrelation between the level of social capital and observable budget cycles. We have shown 
that the existence of political budget cycles turns out to be statistically significant only in low 
social capital countries. At this point it is important to stress that the insights from the 
theoretical model point to a lack of fiscal manipulation in high social capital countries rather 
than the presence of manipulation in lows social capital ones. As such in our results section 
we indeed failed to find evidence of a political budget cycle in high social capital countries 
even in the group of new democracies that have been argued to be responsible for the 
significant results in the literature. Conversely, in most cases we found strong evidence for 
the appearance of budget cycles in low social capital democracies, with the notable exception 
of old democracies. The exception of old democracies hints to an important insight by 
pointing to institutional structures or the presence of other unobservable characteristics in old 
democracies that prevent the existence of Political Budget Cycles. That holds even for low 
social capital democracies in very much the same way we assumed high social capital prevents 
Political Budget Cycles to occur in new democracies. This might imply that high social capital 
is an important institutional characteristic, where formal institutions are not yet highly 
developed. In any case, both our theoretical and empirical contributions, point towards social 
capital as an important underlying mechanism regarding the existence of Political Budget 
Cycles and simultaneously lead to further questions open to future research. 
 
6.1  Limitations 
 
The concept of social capital on a theoretical level is easily interpretable. When it comes 
to measurement and inference methods, however, it is generally more complicated. Thus it is 
important to focus our attention on the possible limitations that are posed by the nature of 
social capital. Additionally we should refer to the limitation of the identification strategy 
undertaken throughout the paper and its shortcomings along with possible data limitations. 
Thus, we will devote the next few paragraphs on these possible limitations and their 
consequences with respect to our results. 
 
6.1.1. The nature of social capital and trust 
 
The nature of social capital due to its interrelation with culture might lead to an implied 
endogeneity problem. Although, as we argued, social capital is a slow changing variable51 and 
we also keep it constant along the sample years, it still might reflect past long-run institutional 
and governmental efficiency along with past economic outcomes. In essence, social capital 
might be a reflection of historical economic and social outcomes of a society and if we 
hypothesize a persistence of these outcomes in the future, then social capital might simply be 
a proxy for the assumption of continuity. Thus, although we argue that social capital changes 
slowly and there will be no endogeneity with present economic outcomes, this may be 
different with respect to the long-run, assuming there is certain persistence in economic 
outcomes. As such, this increases the difficulty of establishing a causal relationship. 
                                                        
51 For example the correlation coefficient between survey waves 25 years apart is approximately 0.93. For further 
evidence please refer to the Appendix, section 8.1.2. 
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Furthermore, following the literature we proxy social capital using generalized trust. The 
data for trust are taken from the World Value Survey. Like every proxy trust is an imperfect 
reflection of social capital and that arguably creates inference issues. Since, finding a perfect 
measure of social capital is not the purpose of this paper we refrain from elaborating on the 
advantages and disadvantages of trust as a proxy. We can only note that, with respect to future 
research, finding a measurement of the ratio of generalized to particularized interest would be 
probably more convincing. As such a ratio of generalized to particularized trust would be 
more relevant from a macroeconomic perspective. Having said that, we firmly believe that 
generalized trust is a fairly decent approximation of the true unobservable value of social 
capital.  
 
6.1.2. Balancing between Type I and Type II errors and data limitations 
 
Similarly, to the literature, during our conditional analysis we contrasted social capital with 
several other proposed dichotomous variables. In order to show that the results were mainly 
driven by the level of social capital we estimated several separate regressions. However, there 
is always the possibility when reducing the sample and running separate regressions to 
commit a Type II error and thus not being able to identify an effect when it is actually present. 
Thus, we should be cautious with the interpretation of our results, especially in the case of 
separate conditional regressions. On the other hand aggregation might lead to finding 
significant effects that are actually driven by other underlying factor, as we have shown. We 
therefore argue that, especially in the cases that we are interested in identifying conditional 
effects we should always try to keep an optimal balance between falsely asserting a condition 
that does not exist or failing to identify a difference when one exists. 
Finally with respect to the data used in the empirical section several limitations apply. First 
we opted for a time span closely matching that of Brender and Drazen (2005), including the 
years form 1960-2001, which we could easily expand, however we chose not to in order to 
keep our results readily comparable. Secondly we use the budget balance as a dependent 
variable, however several other measures have been proposed as alternative fiscal indicators52. 
Lastly, several other controls could be included or present control variables could be 
improved53. 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
As the literature of Political Budget Cycles matured, the underlying debate regarding their 
universal character became increasingly important. Recent evidence points to a conditional 
existence of election effects on fiscal policy, however the source of the conditionality is 
debatable. Several dichotomous variables have been proposed, such as developed and 
developing countries (Shi and Svensson 2002, 2006) or new and established democracies 
(Brender and Drazen 2005) assertions supported by empirical evidence, however theoretically 
less convincing. Thus this paper tries to fill this void by proposing the level of citizen’s social 
capital as the driving force behind the conditionality of budget cycles.  
As such we provide an adapted version of an existing moral hazard model to be used as 
theoretical framework in order to explain the interrelation of social capital and Political 
                                                        
52 For examples see Brender and Drazen (2005). 
53 For example the output gap could be replaced with the growth rate and several institutional controls could be 
added. 
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Budget Cycles formally. Along these lines we show that, as the ratio of low social capital 
voters increases, the incumbent has an incentive to manipulate the economy through 
increasing the deficit in the election year. This is attributed to the particularized interest of 
low social capital citizens, since they tend to highly discount indirect benefits such as public 
debt. 
In the empirical analysis we find evidence in support of an underlying relationship based 
on the level of social capital. Firstly, we show that election effects on fiscal budget are only 
present in low social capital democracies. Additionally, as the level of social capital increases, 
the effect decreases and eventually becomes insignificant. Our results have proven to be fairly 
robust when confronted with other competing theories. Along these lines, we have shown that 
the both for developing and developed democracies only low social capital ones experience 
the presence of Political Budget Cycles. Moreover, governance systems and election rules do 
not seem to have an influence on the prescribed relationship. Finally, although we prove that 
the significance of budget cycles in new democracies is driven by the low social capital ones, 
we fail to do the same with old democracies. 
To conclude, in this paper we provided a theoretical and empirical approach in an effort to 
investigate the relationship between the level of social capital and pre-election fiscal 
manipulation. Although there is strong evidence that a high level of social capital decreases 
the possibility of Political Budget Cycles, further research is needed to solidify this 
interconnection.  
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8.  Appendix 
 
8.1 Data 
 
The data used for the empirical analysis are almost identical to the data used by Brender 
and Drazer (2005). The data extend from 1960 to 2001 and include 63 democratic countries. 
The reason we used this specific time frame54was to have result that can be readily compared 
with that of Brender and Drazen. The controls that we utilized are again aligned with the 
empirical literature on budget cycles 55 . We will first describe all variables used at the 
regressions along with the sources for the data. Table A1 in the next page provides the 
summary statistics for all the main variables. 
 
8.1.1 Budget balance 
 
Our dependent variable is the budget balance which we calculate as the difference 
between Total revenue and Total grants minus Total expenditures as percentage of the GDP. 
All data were taken from the international financial statistics of the IMF.    
 
8.1.2 Social capital 
 
For the variable of social capital we use as proxy generalized trust. Although there has 
been an ongoing discussion in the literature for the appropriateness of the use of trust as a 
proxy for social capital we believe, along with many others in the literature, that is a reason- 
 
 
                                                        
54 Albeit data for year later than 2001 are available. 
55 Several improvements could be made as for example the use of growth instead of output gap based on 
Hodrick- Prescott  (1997) filter due to the inconsistences that this filter can lead to. 
      
Table A1 Summary Statistics of All Variablesa 
 Mean Obs Maximum Minimum Standard 
Deviation 
Balanceb -2.013 1874 19.82 -28.57 3.741 
Elect  0.193 2646 1 0 0.395 
Social Capital  0.278 2646 0.639 0.038 0.138 
Social Capital Dummy 0.492 2646 1 0 0.500 
Log(rGDPpc)  8.431 2302 10.82 5.613 1.019 
Output Gapb 3.637 2304 13.78 -5.188 2.285 
Population above 65 8.319 2585 18.07 2.3 4.332 
Population 15-64 60.80 2585 72.09 47.98 5.904 
Tradeb 58.58 2281 229.8 7.989 34.48 
New Demc 0.540 2646 1 0 0.499 
Old Demc 0.460 2646 1 0 0.499 
a Notes: The sample years are 1960 until 2001. 
b As percentage of GDP 
c For specification see Drazen (2004) 
O. Kouvavas 
 
 
42 
Table A2 Correlation Matrix Different World Values Surveys 
  WVS1 WVS2 WVS3 WVS4 WVS5 
WVS1 1,000     
WVS2 0,903 1,000    
WVS3 0,941 0,923 1,000   
WVS4 0,765 0,867 0,850 1,000  
WVS5 0,914 0,913 0,930 0,875 1,000 
  a Notes: World Value Survey  waves: in 1981,1990-1991, 1995-1996, 1999-2001 and 2005-2007 
 
 
able approximation. The indicator of trust commonly used56 is the measure of generalized 
trust from the World Value Survey (2009). Where data were missing, we used the regional 
barometer (e.g. the Latino Barometer, Asian Barometer) which includes the same question. 
The indicator is based on the well-known survey question: ‘Generally speaking, would you 
say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?’ 
The two options offered as answers are: 1) ‘Most people can be trusted’, 2) ‘You can never 
be too careful when dealing with people” 57. The indicators value is the percentage that answer 
the question picking the first option. Thus refer as the percentage of trust per country. At this 
point it is apparent to see the link with social capital, since social capital refers to the ability 
to cooperate and focus on common interests as contradicted to particularized ones.  
In the World Value Survey there are five separate waves: in 1981, 1990-1991, 1995-
1996, 1999-2001 and 2005-2007. There exist differences on the number of observations per 
country and for that reason we use the average over the first four waves. We opt for taking 
the average over the first four waves to reduce the sampling error and use it only for cross 
country comparisons, not across time. For the dummy variable of social capital we use the 
median to separate the sample into two groups of low and high social capital. The dummy 
takes the value of 1 for high social capital and 0 for low58. Arguably, this separation is 
imperfect however provides model easier to interpret. Additionally we use the level to show 
that our result our robust. 
With respect to endogeneity problems, the trust variable tends to be a very slowly 
changing variable, as can be observe from the correlation between the five waves reported in 
Table A2. Note that the correlation of wave 1 and 5 is around 91% and the two waves are 25 
years apart. As such it is highly unlikely that at the short term the trust levels in a country can 
change dramatically since it tend to be emended in the culture. The issue of endogeneity of 
trust has been thoroughly discussed due to the fact that was used to explain long run growth, 
where indeed it is arguable that a high level of economic growth and development will, in the 
long run, create a high level of social capital, hence trust. However in the short run, as trust 
levels are barely changing across time, this is hardly an issue. Furthermore, the only way trust 
levels change dramatically are due to significant historical events, such as for example civil 
wars, which are arguably uncorrelated with the level of budget balance.  
                                                        
56 See for example Knack and Keefer (1997) , Dearmon and Grier (2011), Gorodnichenko and Roland (2011) 
and Bjǿrnskov (2012) 
57 However sometimes when we use the Latino Barometer there was small variance in the wording of the answers 
that would permit to reply that you agree with both or none, and for that reason we used the valid converted 
percentages that are supplied. 
58 In the general model we use the dummy as we define it here interacted with the election dummy. However in 
the models where we have to check for several conditionalities we use the social capital separation to define 
dummies for elections in low and high social capital countries. 
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8.1.3 Elections 
The election dummy takes the value of 1 during election years and 0 otherwise. The data 
of election years are taken from the Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance. More 
specifically the database is called: ‘Voter Turnout: A global survey’. 
8.1.4 Developing and developed countries 
 
The developed country dummy is taken from the World Fact Book: ‘List of Developed 
countries’ of CIA. The dummy takes the value of 1 when the country belongs to the developed 
countries and the value of 0 when it belongs to less developed or developing ones.   
 
8.1.5 New and old democracies 
 
New democracies are defined as countries that change from autocracy to democracy 
during the sample years. For democracy we use the POLITY IV score. The score takes values 
from -10 for full autocracy to 10 of full democracy. Thus a country changes from autocracy 
to democracy when it the POLITY score changes from autocracy to democracy59. 
 
8.1.6 Constitutional rules 
 
There are two categories and four distinct types of constitutional rules we consider. 
Firstly, we consider electoral rules dependent to the form of the democracy, Presidential or 
Parliamentary. Second, we consider election rules that follow a majoritarian system or 
proportional system. Based on the previous divisions we create election dummies for all 
combinations or more specificly: i) Presidential Low Social Capital, 1 in every election year 
in presidential low social capital countries 0 otherwise. ii) Presidential High Social Capital, 1 
in every election year in presidential high social capital countries 0 otherwise. iii) 
Parliamentary Low Social Capital, 1 in every election year in parliamentary low social capital 
countries 0 otherwise. iv) Parliamentary High Social Capital, 1 in every election year in 
parliamentary low social capital countries 0 otherwise. The same way we make the dummies 
for majoritarian and proportional: i) Proportional Low Social Capital, 1 in every election year 
in proportional low social capital countries 0 otherwise. ii) Proportional High Social Capital, 
1 in every election year in proportional high social capital countries 0 otherwise. iii) 
Majoritarian Low Social Capital, 1 in every election year in parliamentary low social capital 
countries 0 otherwise. iv) Majoritarian High Social Capital, 1 in every election year in 
parliamentary low social capital countries 0 otherwise. 
The data for the election rules are the same as in Persson and Tabellini (2002) and 
Brender and Drazen (2005) and the database where we acquire the data is the DPI – Database 
of Political Institutions. 
 
 
 
8.1.7 Control variables 
 
                                                        
59 For a more elaborate definition see Brender and Drazen (2005) 
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The choice of control variable was done consistently with the literature. All data are 
derived form the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. First control variable we 
use is the natural logarithm of the real GDP per capital for constant US dollars 1995. We use 
Hodrick-Prescott Filter to calculate the trend and subtract it from the real GDP to get the 
output gap. Although the use of the Hodrick-Prescott filter is controversial and in some cases 
in the literature growth rates are used instead, we choose to follow the guidelines of Brender 
and Drazen (2005) to make our results readily comparable.  
There are also two demographic variables included as the percentage of population above 
the age of 65, and the percentage between 15-64. Finally the share of international trade as 
percentage of the GDP is included. 
 
8.2 Stationarity and Cointegration 
 
In order to test for the presence of non- stationarity we apply the unit root test of Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (2003). Their test is referred to in the literature as the IPS test and is a panel 
version of the augmented Dickey Fuller test. The IPS test controls for individual unit roots, 
allowing unit root processes to vary across cross-sections. By using separate regressions60 for 
each cross-section (e.g. country) using the individual time-series, it tests the null hypothesis 
of H0: ρi=0, for all countries against the alternative H1: ρi<0 for some countries, and constructs 
a test statistic (Z-stat)61 by averaging each individual t-statistic. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis of non- stationarity proves the stationarity of the variables. Most of the variables 
tend to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, however if we use the Fischer panel unit root 
test we find that in most cases we fail to reject the null hypothesis. For this reason we need to 
test for cointegration. In order to check for the possibility of cointegration we performed the 
Pedroni test for panel cointegration and for the robustness of the results we also performed 
the Kao panel cointegration test. Both tests are an Engle-Granger based tests, checking if the 
residual of the I(1) variables are I(0). Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Kao (1999) extended the test for 
panel data. The auxiliary regression consider under the Pedroni test is: 
 
                                           𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝜄𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑖,𝑗𝛥(𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
𝑃𝑖
𝑗=1 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡  
 
In his paper Pedroni (1999, 2004) describes various method of creating a test statistic of 
the null hypothesis of no-conintegration H0: ρι=1. The resulting statistics are reported in Table 
A4. As we can observe in two out of three cases the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus we 
conclude that there is cointegration. Furthermore the Kao Test (1999) in its augmented version 
uses the following auxiliary regression: 
 
𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝜓𝑖𝛥(𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
𝑃
𝑗=1 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡  
 
 
Table A3 Unit Root Testsa 
 Unit Root Test 
                                                        
60 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑖
𝑗=1 𝛥𝑦𝑖𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛿 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
61 𝑍 =
(∑ 𝑡𝑖 𝑇𝑖(𝑝𝑖
𝑁
𝑖−1 )
𝑁
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H0     Nonstationarity 
     Im, Pesaran and Shin                                 Fischer 
 Z-Statistic P-value χ2-statitic        P-value 
Balance -3.04510 0.0012       226.9002 0.0000 
Elect -1.2  1015 0.0000        2270.323 0.0000 
Log(rGDPpc) -2.72853 0.0032     56.1218 1.0000 
Output Gapb -37.8301 0.0000       1406.529 0.0000 
Population above 65 5.07001 1.0000     84.9133 0.9981 
Population 15-64 -1.81903 0.0345      127.8091 0.4383 
Tradeb -1.87964 0.0301      105.9709 0.9020 
a Notes: The sample years are 1960 until 2001. 
b As percentage of GDP 
 
Table A4 Cointegration Testsa 
 Pedroni cointegration testb  
ρ-statistic PP-statistic ADF-statistic 
6.2699 (0.99998) -17.54323 (0.0000) -4.5920 (0.0000) 
 Kao cointegration testc  
 ADF-statistic  
 -16.24738 (0.0000)  
a Notes: The probabilities are reported inside the brackets. 
b The null hypothesis of the Perdoni test  is of no-cointegration  
c The null hypothesis of the Kao test  is of no-cointegration  
 
 
By using a constructed ADF statistic tests the null hypothesis of no cointegretion. In our case 
the results are consistent with the Pedroni results and do reject the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration. Thus both test point to the presence of cointegration. 
 
 
8.3 Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity  
 
Initially, with respect to heteroskedasticity, if we regress the square of predicted residuals 
on all the explanatory variables and their interactions we find that several variables prove to 
be significant even at 1% significance, which is a clear sign of rejecting the null of conditional 
homoscedasticity. The variance or the residual tends to depend on the lag of balance, the 
population above 65, the population between 15 and 64, and the share of trade. Thus in our 
regression we need to use clustered robust standard errors as we drop the assumption of 
conditional homoscedasticity.  
Additionally, although in the fixed effects models we assume that the error term is not 
serially correlated, that does not need to be the case. As such the problem that might arise is 
that in the presence of serial correlation the lag of the dependent variable will be correlated 
with the error term. For that reason we repeat all the regressions with the use of GMM method 
of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). However, it is proven that the 
standard GMM errors tend to be severally downward biased and to solve this problem we use 
the Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. 
 
 
Table A5 Determinants of Budget Balance  
Correlation Matrix: Main Variablesa 
O. Kouvavas 
 
 
46 
 Trade Popul. 
15-64 
Population 
65 
Log 
(rGDPpc) 
Output 
Gap 
Elect Social 
Capital 
New Dem 
Trade  1.00        
Popul. 15-64  0.26  1.00       
Population 65  0.28  0.83  1.00      
Log(rGDPpc)  0.31  0.80  0.76  1.00     
Output Gap -0.03 -0.25 -0.30 -0.29  1.00    
Elect  0.04  0.09  0.10  0.12 -0.04  1.00   
Social Capital  0.02  0.45  0.58  0.39 -0.08  0.10  1.00  
New Dem -0.23 -0.40 -0.45 -051 -0.05 -0.13 -0.45 1.00 
   a Notes:  There are indications for the presence of multi-colinearity between: Population 65, Popul. 15-64, Log(rGDPpc) 
   
 
 
8.4 Multi-collinearity  
 
In table A5 we report the correlations between the main variables. As we can observe the 
two demographics variables, population percentage above 65 and population percentage 
between 15-64, are highly correlated with each other and are also correlated to the logarithm 
of real GDP per capita. Thus we have a case of multi-collinearity. However, all these variables 
are the control variables used by the literature and by not including them we risk an omitted 
variable bias. Furthermore, as we are not really interested in the significance of the controls 
and as such we do not worry for the case of increased standard errors that might be the result 
of the multi-collinearity. Thus after stating this cautionary note we conclude that we should 
include them even if there is a chance of multi-collinearity. 
 
8.5 Supplemental tables 
 
In this section we provide all tables that were not included in the main text. Table A6 is the 
separate regression result for developing and developed countries based on the level of social 
capital. Although the information that we are interested in is mostly summarized in the 
marginal effects graphs in the main text we include the table. Furthermore Table A8 is similar 
to A6 with the only difference that the separation is between New and Old democracies. Table 
A7 checks for the significance of the ‘New democracies’ Effect in high social capital countries 
where we observe that there is no election effect, neither for Old nor for New democracies in 
the case of high social capital countries. Finally in Table A9 we report the result of the 
robustness tests using the GMM method of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) for developing and developed or New and Old democracies. We choose not to perform 
separate regression as in the cases of table 4 and 6 of the main article as this GMM method is 
tailored for panels with large cross section and short time span. Hence, if we divide the sample 
we end up with the year dimension being larger than the cross section. As such, we opt for a 
specification where we define election dummies for each category and use full sample 
regressions, similarly to constitutional rules election dummies. The results seem fairly robust 
and consistent with our earlier estimates.  
 
 
Table A6 Electoral Effects on Budget Balance: Developing versus Developed Countries and Social Capital 
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Dependent variable Balance as percent of GDP 
Panel Fixed Effectsa – Separate Regressions based on Levels 
 [1] All Countries  [2] Developing  [3] Developed  
 ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽   ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽  ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽  
Election b -0.8723*** (0.3213)  -1.0376*** (0.3881)  -0.8819* (0.5111)  
Election*Social Cap.  1.5978** (0.7440)   2.5458 (1.5420)   1.5891 (1.1370)  
Lagged Balance   0.6085*** (0.0609)    0.4883*** (0.0850)   0.7732*** (0.0204)  
Log(rGDPpc)c  0.3510 (0.2881)   0.2043 (0.4873)   0.4396 (0.3289)  
Output Gapd  0.2161*** (0.0481)   0.1270** (0.0510)   0.4418*** (0.0894)  
Population above 65 -0.1988** (0.0960)  -0.2001 (0.2646)   0.0378 (0.1013)  
Population 15-64  0.0517 (0.0479)   0.0788 (0.0763)   0.0049 (0.0483)  
Tradee -0.0000 (0.0061)   0.0057 (0.0093)  -0.0026 (0.0071)  
Constant -5.9511*** (2.0312)  -6.8668** (2.7331)  -6.537** (2.4729)  
          
Countries 63   39  24  
Observations 1762   911  851  
R2 0.59   0.46  0.55  
a Notes: The model is estimated using a  fixed effects panel regression with balance as a dependent variable. * denotes 
significance at the 10 percent level. ** at the 5 percent level. *** at the 1 percent level. β’s are the coefficients and σβ are the 
cluster robust standard errors. 
b Dummy variable taking the value of 1 at election years and 0 otherwise. 
   c Log of real Gross Domestic Product per Capital 
d Calculated using Hodrick- Prescott (1997) filter for each individual country based on the trend. 
   e Trade as percentage of GDP 
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Table A8 Electoral Effects on Budget Balance: New versus Established Democracies and Social Capital 
Dependent variable Balance as percent of GDP 
 Panel Fixed Effectsa – Full Sample  
 [1] All Countries  [2] High Social Capital 
 ?̂?𝑖  ?̂?𝛽  
  𝛾𝑖  ?̂?𝛾 
 
Election*New Democracies -0.9277*** (0.3152)   -0.0578 (0.0188)  
Election*Old Democracies  0.0670 (0.1085)   -0.0665 (0.1292)  
        
Lagged Balance   0.6088*** (0.0608)    0.7891*** (0.0188)  
Log(rGDPpc)c  0.3638 (0.2826)    0.1671 (0.2662)  
Output Gapd  0.2154*** (0.0482)    0.2625*** (0.0649)  
Population above 65 -0.1990** (0.0946)   -0.0334 (0.0757)  
Population 15-64  0.0522 (0.0479)    0.0455 (0.0391)  
Tradee  0.0003 (0.0061)    0.0031 (0.0059)  
Constant -6.0666*** (2.0501)   -5.4672*** (1.7241)  
        
Countries 63   31  
Observations 1762   983  
R2 0.59   0.80  
a Notes: The model is estimated using a  fixed effects panel regression with balance as a dependent variable. * denotes 
significance at the 10 percent level. ** at the 5 percent level. *** at the 1 percent level. β’s are the coefficients and σβ are the  
cluster robust standard errors. 
b Dummy variable taking the value of 1 at election years and 0 otherwise. 
c Log of real Gross Domestic Product per Capital 
d Calculated using Hodrick- Prescott (1997)  filter for each individual country based on the trend. 
e Trade as percentage of GDP 
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Dependent variable Balance as percent of GDP 
Panel Fixed Effectsa – Separate Regressions based on Levels 
 [1] All Democracies  [2] New Democracies  [3] Old Democracies  
 ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽   ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽  ?̂?𝑖 ?̂?𝛽  
Election b -0.8723*** (0.3213)  -2.0843*** (0.7166)  -0.0256 (0.2905)  
Election*Social Cap.  1.5978** (0.7440)   5.3117** (2.4810)  -0.0957 (0.7348)  
Lagged Balance   0.6085*** (0.0609)    0.3884*** (0.1148)   0.7310*** (0.0339)  
Log(rGDPpc)c  0.3510 (0.2881)  -0.2600 (0.5714)   0.4574 (0.2750)  
Output Gapd  0.2161*** (0.0481)   0.2087*** (0.0676)   0.2819*** (0.0739)  
Population above 65 -0.1988** (0.0960)  -0.3038 (0.1971)  -0.0941 (0.0882)  
Population 15-64  0.0517 (0.0479)   0.2411** (0.1042)   0.0016 (0.0424)  
Tradee -0.0000 (0.0061)  -0.0169 (0.0136)   0.0050 (0.0043)  
Constant -5.9511*** (2.0312)  -11.131*** (3.9328)  -5.0834** (2.2905)  
          
Countries 63   34  29  
Observations 1762   746  1016  
R2 0.59   0.35  0.73  
a Notes: The model is estimated using a  fixed effects panel regression with balance as a dependent variable. * denotes 
significance at the 10 percent level. ** at the 5 percent level. *** at the 1 percent level. β’s are the coefficients and σβ are the 
cluster robust standard errors. 
b Dummy variable taking the value of 1 at election years and 0 otherwise. 
c Log of real Gross Domestic Product per Capital 
d Calculated using Hodrick- Prescott (1997) filter for each individual country based on the trend. 
   e Trade as percentage of GDP 
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Table A9 Electoral Effects on Budget Balance 
Dependent variable Balance as percent of GDP 
 GMMa – Full Sample  
 [1] Developing and Developed  [2] New and Old Dem. 
 ?̂?𝑖  ?̂?𝛽  
  𝛾𝑖  ?̂?𝛾 
 
Elect*Developing*Lowb -0.6484** (0.3087)      
Elect*Developing*Highb -0.4768 (0.9033)      
Elect*Developed*Lowb -2.2506** (0.9148)      
Elect*Developed*Highb -0.1055 (0.1650)      
Elect*New*Lowc     -1.5548*** (0.5386)  
Elect*New*Highc     -0.4606 (0.9626)  
Elect*Old*Lowc     -0.2213 (0.5501)  
Elect*Old*Highc     -0.1708 (0.1437)  
        
Lag_1 Balanced  0.5523*** (0.0657)    0.5608*** (0.0602)  
Lag_2 Balance  0.0488 (0.0937)    0.0725 (0.0959)  
Log(rGDPpc)e  0.7583  (1.1793)    0.8847 (1.1899)  
Output Gapf  0.3567** (0.1459)    0.4104** (0.1772)  
Population above 65  0.1374 (0.2156)   -0.0468 (0.2222)  
Population 15-64 -0.1519 (0.1899)   -0.0305 (0.1926)  
Tradeg  0.0220 (0.0164)    0.0267** (0.0134)  
Constant -1.6908 (9.5016)   -9.0788 (9.9049)  
        
Countries 63   63  
Observations 1682   1682  
Instruments 269   269  
Arellano-Bond Test for  
AR(1) (p-value)   
0.0015 
  0.0020  
Arellano-Bond Test for  
AR(2) (p-value)   
0.1628 
  0.1359  
Hansen Testh  
(p-value) 
1.0000 
  1.0000  
a Notes: The model is estimated using  Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)  methodology with balance 
as a dependent variable. * denotes significance at the 10 percent level. ** at the 5 percent level. *** at the 1 percent level. β’s 
are the coefficients and σβ are the Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors. 
b Dummies variable taking the value of 1 at election years for developing or developed countries with low or high social 
capital respectively and 0 otherwise. 
c Dummies variable taking the value of 1 at election years for new or old democracies with low or high social capital 
respectively and 0 otherwise. 
    d Instrumented based on  Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . 
e Log of real Gross Domestic Product per Capital 
f Calculated using Hodrick- Prescott  (1997) filter for each individual country based on the trend. 
h Trade as percentage of GDP 
g Statistical test for instrument over identification. Null Hypothesis: the error is uncorrelated with the instruments. 
